2015/03/27 Jean Lake crash

[Tad Eareckson]

Jean Dry Lakebed Accident Report and Analysis - 2015/05/11

Post-accident inspection of the release showed the release pin still in place.

Excellent job on that score, Kelly...

Manned Kiting
The Basic Handbook of Tow Launched Hang Gliding
Daniel F. Poynter
1974

"The greatest dangers are a rope break or a premature release." - Richard Johnson

You totally eliminated one of the two greatest dangers to a hang glider tow.

A temporary repair was in place on the bridle's release pin lanyard arrangement.

Oh bullshit. Had this been a TEMPORARY repair it most assuredly wouldn't have stayed in place through all that rapidly increasing towline pressure and two-handed lanyard pulling. This job was done RIGHT. Lifetime warranty material.

The release pin was prevented from being retracted by that temporary repair which routed the release pin lanyard in a fashion requiring exceptional force to affect a release.

So?

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=21033
barrels release without any tension except weight of rope..

Bart Weghorst - 2011/02/25 19:06:26 UTC

I've had it once where the pin had bent inside the barrel from excessive tow force. My weaklink was still intact. The tug pilot's weaklink broke so I had the rope. I had to use two hands to get the pin out of the barrel.

No stress because I was high.

They were high weren't they? 390 feet? Two hundred is generally considered to be about the top of the kill zone.

Inspectors on the ground were able to activate the release following the accident only by the application of exceptional force.

InspectorS plural. No single individual was able to pry this thing open by himself under negligible tension. Pity Kelly apparently didn't think to ask his eleven year old skydiving student for a li'l help.

In what kind of shape did the inspectors find the typical two loop / four strand weak link for tandem surface tow operations properly installed and positioned between the tow bridle and the tow line? Was it still OK or did it look a bit stressed out and likely to break inconsistently in turbulence such that it needed to be replaced with a new one before the next member of the Moorhead-Schneider family was able to go up for his or her skydiving lesson? (When a student breaks or stresses out a weak link does he get charged for the replacement cost and labor?)

Although the tandem instructor had a hook knife in a sheath on the right downtube next to the flight instrument, no effort was made to obtain the knife. It did not appear that the tandem instructor was in an attitude where it would have been possible for him to extract the knife from its sheath...

It was in a sheath? Oh, right. You just told us the tandem instructor had a hook knife in a sheath on the right downtube next to the flight instrument. Sorry, I wasn't paying attention. Please continue.

...and get to a position to cut the tow line bridle once the lockout fully developed.

Name somebody who's EVER been in an attitude where it would have been possible for him to extract the knife from its sheath and get to a position to cut the towline bridle - as opposed to the reflex bridle - once a lockout has fully developed, or started to develop, or started to appear on the distant horizon. Only a tiny fraction of these assholes are able to complete the easy reach to their primary releases. Motherfuckers.

Although the tandem instructor had a parachute...

How 'bout the eleven year old skydiving student? I'd have certainly thunk he'd have also had a parachute.

...no effort was made to throw the chute;

Or the PARAchute you just mentioned a moment ago.

...it appeared that the instructor's focus during the lockout was exclusively on activating the release.

Go figure.

So although the tandem instructor had a hook knife in a sheath on the right downtube next to the flight instrument, no effort was made to obtain the knife and it did not appear that the tandem instructor was in an attitude where it would have been possible for him to extract the knife from its sheath and get to a position to cut the tow line bridle once the lockout fully developed. And although the tandem instructor had a parachute, no effort was made to throw the chute as it appeared that the instructor's focus during the lockout was exclusively on activating the release.

So where was the Push-To-Talk Button? Apparently had no problem engaging in idle chatter during the three minutes when the glider was going up. He had nine seconds worth of terrorizing vertical lockout preceded by fifty-three seconds of his glider going the wrong way at a moderate descent rate in which a freewheeled winch would've made this a nonevent.

- Didn't appear that the tandem instructor was in an attitude where it would have been possible for him to request the truck driver who served both as the driver and winch operator, with control over the tow pressure control mechanism from inside the cab of the tow vehicle to control the tow pressure in a more appropriate manner?

- No effort was made to push the Push-To-Talk button as it appeared that the instructor's focus during the lockout was exclusively on activating the release?

Bill Bryden - 1998/12

Unfortunately, we suffered a fatal towing accident earlier this year but only recently received some details about it. Richard Graham, and advanced pilot with 24 years of experience, was fatally injured in a towing accident on May 15, 1998 near Grover, Colorado.

Rich was platform-launch towing in strong (25-30 mph) winds crossing 35-40 degrees to the tow road. Thermal activity was also reported as moderately strong. The launch sequence commenced with the "go to cruise" command, and the glider cleared the tow vehicle. Approximately 300-400 feet of line unspooled, and according to the data memory in the vario the glider reached about 80-90 feet AGL. The pilot then radioed to the vehicle driver to stop, and a few seconds later the VOX on his radio transmitted the words, "Oh no." The glider impacted in a steep nose-down attitude and then inverted.

It is suspected that no attempt was made by Rich to release since the towline was still attached after impact, and the release and winch were determined to be functioning properly before and after the accident. The event was not witnessed directly so it is unknown precisely what happened. It is suspected that the very strong and crossing conditions were a primary factor in this accident.

COMMENTARY

After this accident and other similar towing accidents and incidents, a common reaction by many pilots is to question why the weak link did not break. Too often the discussion evolves into questioning the breaking strength of the weak link and suggesting that weak links with lower breaking thresholds be used.

I was recently told about a platform-launch towing incident a close friend experienced of which I was not aware. He launched and was quickly turned away from the towline. This progressed to a lockout, crashing the glider into soft ground which spared the pilot serious injury. When asked why he hadn't released, the pilot commented, "I thought the weak link would break!" For those unaware, a weak link is very simply a device, typically a loop of string, added to the tow system that is intended to break in the event that towline tensions exceed a safe or desired threshold, thus freeing the glider from the towline.

But let's make real sure we don't talk about the radio too much. We've only got two options here: either the tandem instructor was too focused to use it or the truck driver who served both as the driver and winch operator, with control over the tow pressure control mechanism from inside the cab of the tow vehicle failed to respond to it. And neither of those is very good.

[Tad Eareckson]

Jean Dry Lakebed Accident Report and Analysis - 2015/05/11

This accident demonstrates a "perfect storm" of multiple factors where the elimination of any one or two of them might have prevented the fatal result.

This "ACCIDENT", like virtually all serious glider crashes, wasn't an ACCIDENT. It was just the usual SOP clusterfuck that the operation got away with for all the flights prior to its last - the one that really mattered. It's really not even worth talking about 'cept for the fact that it's emblematic of the institutionalized stupidity, incompetence, corruption, sleaziness that's destroyed virtually all hope of fixing this flavor of aviation. Instead of picking apart the things that were done wrong in the course of making this disaster happen we should be looking at the five percent of the operation that was being done right and building on that.

Although tandem hang gliding fatalities are exceptionally rare, the rarity of such events should not give you any comfort.

Fuck you and the horse you rode in on.

Instead, you should review your own tandem and towing operational practices to see where you can take steps to decrease the inherent risks.

- Yeah, *I* should review MY own tandem and towing operational practices to see where I can take steps to decrease the inherent risks because these pinnacles of 45 years of u$hPa towing evolution were routinely fucking up in every way imaginable.

- Make sure you don't ELIMINATE any of the "INHERENT RISKS" (read: deliberately designed-in negligence and stupidity) - Just REDUCE them a bit. If we ELIMINATE them...

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=27736
Increase in our USHpA dues

Mark G. Forbes - 2012/12/20 06:21:33 UTC

There are also numerous legal issues associated with accident reports, which we're still wrestling with. It's a trade-off between informing our members so they can avoid those kinds of accidents in the future, and exposing ourselves to even more lawsuits by giving plaintiff's attorneys more ammunition to shoot at us.

Imagine a report that concludes, "If we'd had a procedure "x" in place, then it would have probably prevented this accident. And we're going to put that procedure in place at the next BOD meeting." Good info, and what we want to be able to convey. But what comes out at trial is, "Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, my client suffered injury because USHPA knew or should have known that a safety procedure was not in place, and was therefore negligent and at fault." We're constantly walking this line between full disclosure and handing out nooses at the hangmen's convention.

...we commit institutional suicide. So just do stuff like checking your two-string more carefully just prior to launch, duct taping your hook knife to a position within easier reach, using thicker helmets and buckling them on whenever you're within a hundred yards of a tensioned glider.

You are encouraged to re-read the excellent article by Mike Meier, "Why Can't We Get a Handle On This Safety Thing?" (http://www.willswing.com/why-cant-we-get-a-handle-on-this-safety-thing/). Although published in 1998, the risk mitigation analyses and approaches in the article are timeless and still applicable.

Yeah?

Michael Meier - 10969
- H5 - 1980/03/08 - M. Turchen - AT FL AWCL CL FSL RLF TUR XC
- P3 - 1991/09/14 - Cary Mendes - FL

Mike's not a tandem or tow rated pilot. Ya think there's any way this "privileged info" could come out through folks like Rodie and many other "mentors" through a method of information decimation and discussion to get him better up to speed on these aspects of our sport? And, fuck, the death glider in this one was one of his. And he says:

Wills Wing
Falcon 140, 170, 195, 225
Falcon 2 140, 170, 195, 225, Tandem
Owner / Service Manual
April 2005 - Ninth Edition

The Falcons have been designed for foot launched soaring flight. They have not been designed to be motorized, tethered, or towed.

And this glider was motorized, tethered, AND towed. I think we're looking at a total nonstarter here. I'm thinking we should just be launching these things from the surrounding slopes:

10-05810
http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8810/16637299103_430a3e383a_o.png


just like Rick Masters has been telling us all.

Additionally, the technical information in "Towing Aloft" by Dennis Pagen and Bill Bryden is an excellent and complete reference on towing equipment and procedures.

Currently available from the u$hPa $tore for just $29.95. No tow pilot should ever be without a copy or two. And when you've literally written the book on the subject there's no fuckin' way you should ever hafta lower yourself to the level of decimating anything about any of these issues to any of us rank and file muppets.

But this confuses me just a wee bit. If the excellent book, Towing Aloft, by Dennis Pagen and Bill Bryden is such an excellent and complete reference on towing equipment and procedures, then why are you having to have this "privileged info" coming out through folks like Rodie and many other "mentors" through a method of information decimation and discussion to reduce its inherent risks? Why don't you just give us a list of relevant page numbers so we can get everything right? I'd really like to know how I can make one of those typical two loop / four strand weak links for tandem surface tow operations, properly install and position it between the tow bridle and the towline, and find out how it increases the safety of the towing operation and what will happen to us if we use something else.

The USHPA Safety & Training, Towing and Tandem Committees are working together on an operations advisory bulletin regarding tandem and towing operations to assist you in reducing your risk.

Fuck, we'll just read the article and you can give us the page numbers. And in Towing Aloft you can totally ELIMINATE the risk. There's nothing really bad that can happen to you just as long as...

Bill Bryden - 2000/02

Dennis Pagen informed me several years ago about an aerotow lockout that he experienced. One moment he was correcting a bit of alignment with the tug and the next moment he was nearly upside down. He was stunned at the rapidity. I have heard similar stories from two other aerotow pilots.

...you're not stupid enough to try make a release yourself or use anything other than an appropriate weak link with a finished length of 1.5 inches or less.

Recommendations for reduction of risk in tandem/towing operations will likely include:

Will LIKELY include? I thought you weren't gonna put this report out until it was totally complete to preclude...

http://ozreport.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=41697
Two Dead on Hang Glider

Mitch Shipley - 2015/04/17 21:44:06 UTC

Since then we have independently analyzed what we have and continued to assist the local police with their investigation, which likely will take some time (weeks) to finalize, as is the case with most aviation accident investigations. Barring any findings that warrant telling USHPA pilots immediately for safety reasons (and we don't have any findings like that to date) there will be no reports about what happened until after the investigation is complete to preclude putting out speculative or incorrect information.

...putting out speculative or incorrect information. Sounds like you're really pushing the envelope in these departments, dude.

- Recommendation that payout winch tow operations utilize knowledgeable and trained spotters capable of observing the entire flight and releasing tow tension by both dropping system drag and severing the tow line;

- But utilize whomever the fuck you want for the driver. It's a fundamental tenet of our sport that it's physically impossible for any driver to ever have any degree of negative effect on the glider's safety. A spotter can have only a positive effect on the tow by recognizing when the glider's thinking he can fix a bad thing and doesn't wanna start over and fixes whatever's going on back there by giving him the rope. And if he errs on the side of caution... Fuck, a bit of inconvenience. Always thank him for intentionally releasing you, even if you feel you could have ridden it out. He should be given a vote of confidence that he made a good decision in the interest of your safety.

- And then it's just like an instant hands free release. Tension's dropped, towline's severed - you just fly away.

- Probably wanna utilize at least a secondary and probably a tertiary spotter capable of observing the entire flight and releasing tow tension by both dropping system drag and severing the towline. We only had a primary on this one - and it didn't work out so well.

- Recommendation that before each flight, the Tandem Instructor perform a demonstration of the activation of the primary and secondary release systems immediately prior to every flight both as a teaching moment for the student pilot and test of the release system;

- REALLY BRUTAL tests of the primary and secondary release systems. If there are any possible problems with your systems these tests...

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=3107
I have a tandem rating!!!

Lauren Tjaden - 2008/03/23 22:20:15 UTC

When Jim got me locked out to the right, I couldn't keep the pitch of the glider with one hand for more than a second (the pressure was a zillion pounds, more or less), but the F'ing release slid around when I tried to hit it. The barrel release wouldn't work because we had too much pressure on it.

Anyhow, the tandem can indeed perform big wingovers, as I demonstrated when I finally got separated from the tug.

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=3391
More on Zapata and weak link

Paul Tjaden - 2008/07/22 04:32:22 UTC

I have never had a lockout situation happen so quickly and dramatically and had no chance to release as I have always thought I could do.

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=21033
barrels release without any tension except weight of rope..

Bart Weghorst - 2011/02/25 19:06:26 UTC

I've had it once where the pin had bent inside the barrel from excessive tow force. My weaklink was still intact. The tug pilot's weaklink broke so I had the rope. I had to use two hands to get the pin out of the barrel.

No stress because I was high.

...will most assuredly reveal them.

- Name some surface tow operations that use secondary releases - other than hook knives duct taped to downtubes I mean.

- Recommendation that wheels not be mounted outside the control frame;

- Ya think?

- Is there anything about that in the excellent article by Mike Meier, "Why Can't We Get a Handle On This Safety Thing?" or the Wills Wing Falcon Owner's Manual. Shouldn't we verify the appropriateness of this move before putting it in black and white?

- Reminder of the low cost and easy reduction of risk through an early termination of a tow as compared to the potential high cost and inherent risk of continuing a "non-perfect" tow;

- Do any of you useless goddam pigfuckers actually tow hang gliders? Show me some videos of these mythical pilots who get fucked up 'cause they think they can fix bad things and don't wanna start over.

And I got news for ya. Tow launches are ANYTHING BUT low cost and they're ALL DANGEROUS. Aborting one 'cause you don't have everything lined up perfectly then relighting in the same conditions pretty much doubles your likelihood of piling in. Way more than doubles it after you've factored in the emergency landing.

- I thought we had a typical two loop / four strand weak link for tandem surface tow operations properly installed and positioned between the tow bridle and the tow line to keep us from getting into too much trouble.

- Reminder of your ability to reduce the inherent risk by being ready, proficient and able to get through all of the sequential emergency lockout procedures - "release, cut, throw parachute" -within the time/altitude available.

Don't forget focused. Any way tandem and tow pilots can get second little red rubber wristbands to keep them doubly safe?

In response to this incident, your thoughts and ideas are actively solicited as we use the lessons learned to develop the operations advisory bulletin to help our other pilots and students avoid similar fates.

But if you're not a paid up u$hPa tandem or tow rated pilot you can go fuck yourself. Go back to Tad's hole in the ground. While you're there, ask him why he was banned from every east coast flying site.

[Tad Eareckson]

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=32681
Tandem crash in LV (speculation thread)

Mark G. Forbes - 2015/03/30 23:29:59 UTC

Please, no speculation

Hi folks,

I understand the interest in learning the cause of this, but could we please not speculate on the forum? We have a very experienced tow administrator (Mitch Shipley) headed to Las Vegas to do an accident investigation, and when we learn what really happened we'll convey that information to our members. He'll be working with two of the local instructors there to get to the truth.

And then he'll be working with all the Board and Tim Herr to figure out the best ways to bury it.

Meanwhile, please refrain from offering speculation or opinion on what might have happened, what might have been theoretically done to prevent it and so on.

Here's MY theory, Mark...

Capt. Peter Boffelli - 2015/03/27
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

The glider was supposed to release the tether from the truck itself. Apparently that tether release did not occur. So what occurred was when that truck turned around thinking that the tether was released the glider itself plummeted straight to the ground.

If the release of the tether from the truck itself had apparently occurred and/or if the truck hadn't turned around thinking that the tether was released the glider itself wouldn't have plummeted straight to the ground. Do you or any members of your crack investigation and privileged information decimation teams have any better THEORIES at this point?

Emotions are raw, people are hurting...

...or have suffered fatal injuries or perished...

...and uninformed speculation doesn't help anybody.

And ferchrisake don't engage in any INFORMED speculation. A lot of us could be looking at being sued out of existence and/or heading to prison if the truth gets out before we've had the opportunity to decimate it.

News reports are of little use...

...to the Corporation and its top information decimators...

...since they're written by people who have no idea how our sport works or what is typical.

And knowing how our sport, versus stuff like competent aviation, Newtonian physics, grade school arithmetic, works and what's TYPICAL, in the ass covering sewer we've been refining for decades, is absolutely critical to the success of our privileged information decimation program.

Thanks for your understanding and patience.

You don't really need to thank your Jack and Davis Show douchebag buddies for their understanding and patience. None of them have attention spans much longer than fifteen seconds or any actual interest in what might have been theoretically done to prevent the tandem instructor from suffering fatal injuries during the flight or his eleven year old student from also perishing.

The counter clockwise circuit tow around the lake bed was a typical operation for pilots in the area.

The payout winch was a typical hydraulic pressure controlled payout winch system mounted on a trailer with a remotely positioned pressure gauge/control valve/pressure release lever that was in the cab of the tow vehicle.

A typical two loop / four strand weak link for tandem surface tow operations was properly installed and positioned between the tow bridle and the tow line.

The tandem instructor next attempted to release from the tow line by pulling on the lanyard connected to the release pin of a typical two string surface tow release system.

When something is TYPICAL it's obviously so because it's the product of near half a century's worth of evolution and refinement. "Nuthin' really interesting to see here, folks. Let's move along to the next exhibit... Nope. This is typical too. I dunno, probably an invisible dust devil."

The counterclockwise circuit tow around the lakebed was a typical operation for pilots in the area. (And we'll just lie about the part where the driver thought the glider was off tow, turned abruptly towards the middle of the lakebed, freewheeled the winch, and hit the rewind button with the glider sideways, continued downwind. We'll just present it as a typical turn for the downwind leg that the stupid glider didn't follow.)

The payout winch was a typical hydraulic pressure controlled payout winch system mounted on a trailer with a remotely positioned pressure gauge/control valve/pressure release lever that was in the cab of the tow vehicle. So the truck driver who served both as the driver and winch operator, with control over the tow pressure control mechanism from inside the cab of the tow vehicle could just monitor the remotely positioned pressure gauge to verify that the tandem instructor was OK and didn't really need mirrors or a secondary spotter.

A typical two loop / four strand weak link for tandem surface tow operations was properly installed and positioned between the tow bridle and the tow line so we don't need to know the breaking strength, material, intended purposes, relations to glider weight and release capacity, reason it didn't break when it was supposed to.

The tandem instructor attempted to release from the tow line by pulling on the lanyard connected to the release pin of a typical two-string surface tow release "system" so, obviously, no US tandem instructors are using typical THREE-string release systems, Western European tandem instructors are using Kochs, Eastern European tandem instructors are using Kaluzhins. Nope, its been used successfully quite literally HUNDREDS of times. Wouldn't be typical otherwise.

The word "typical" - which we see four times in this privileged information decimation - is virtually totally absent from crash reports through the Nineties and ACTUALLY totally absent employed for these obvious purposes:
- imply that a procedure, action, system, component is the best for the application
- deflect attention from critical, damning, omitted, and falsified elements of the report

Whenever you see these motherfuckers using the word "TYPICAL" watch the fuck out. Your heart should start pounding and your senses should immediately shift to high alert mode. On 2013/02/02 Zack Marzec was fatally inconvenienced by his typical one loop / two strand weak link for aerotow operations properly installed and positioned between the left end of his pro toad bridle and the tow loop on his shoulder and never before in the history of the sport have we seen such a viciously and illegally enforced universal piece of safety equipment - and its enforcers, proponents, defenders - so instantly become so totally A-typical.

[Tad Eareckson]

In case anyone hadn't noticed... The writing on this "report" is both infuriating and nauseating. Makes ya wanna smash the heads of the perpetrators into a wall. Looks like something a stupid and pretentious tenth grader with nothing to say would've spewed out to fill up the ten page minimum of an assignment. Pagen did the same sorta thing to give his excellent book ten times the weight volume it would've had if it were concise fiction but - as a good part of his motivation was to have suckers give him money - this is twenty times worse.

Causes the reader to wear down and glaze over before making it all the way through the fifth paragraph - which was obviously the intent. Had to force myself to wade through the cesspool about twenty times to catch what I'm hoping were the bulk of the lies, misrepresentations, omissions, obfuscatations, diversions, misdirections...

Bryden's an asshole but not in tha same league as his excellent book "coauthor". Here's a damn good 1992 prequel to the Kelly/Arys:
http://www.kitestrings.org/post7910.html#p7910
from which all learned the lessons to keep a neadless tragedy like it from ever happening again.

1993/05

USHGA Accident Report Follow-up
by Bill Bryden

There has been reference to a towing accident in recent issues of Hang Gliding and I have heard discussion about it in various places, including the recent Board of Directors meeting. Discussions about this event have tried to identify lessons to be learned or ways in which we can improve the safety of our sport. However; many of these discussions have been without benefit of all the facts. This leads to erroneous assumptions and possibly wrong conclusions.

In discussing this with Doug Hildreth, Gil Dodgen and a few pilots who knew Ron Smith, the victim, it was decided that the whole story needed to be told. To that end, we are publishing the accident investigation report and comments exactly as I submitted them last October. I believe it is self-explanatory.

I want it understood that this report is not intended to place any blame or suggest any particular wrongdoing on the part of any of the individuals involved, nor should it be interpreted that way. We need to be sensitive to all involved, and be certain not to add any insult to the injury that has already resulted from this tragedy. It is being published so you may understand what happened, so you may see any parallels with your own towing operations, and so you may hopefully alter your procedures if needed to improve your safety. Ron would have wanted that.

A brief explanation as to why the towing was being conducted the way it was: The goal was to make a lot of launches and landings without getting very high, in order to practice these skills. Basically, the towing in this case was being used to create a 100-foot training hill.

1992/09/10 ~ 19:00 CDT - Rural location near Akin, Illinois
Ron Smith - 55 - West Frankfort, Illinois - Advanced, Basic Instructor
Enterprise Wings Foil - Harness: Spaghetti-style - Helmet: BMX bicycle-type, full-face coverage

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

The accident occurred in the evening just prior to sunset, and wind conditions were reported as calm to one mph with no significant gust factor. Ron had helped a student take six training tow flights prior to his taking a flight and there were no problems during any of these. The location was a flat, open field at least a quarter mile long with about a 100-foot-wide strip mowed down the middle of the taller grass.

The tow vehicle was a pickup truck equipped with a payout winch mounted in the middle of the bed. The winch operator would sit forward of the winch between it and the back of the cab and could communicate to the driver through the open sliding back window. The winch operator had operated the winch hundreds of times and was very familiar with its operation and the towing procedure. The truck driver similarly had driven the truck many times and was quite familiar with the towing operation.

The launch method was not platform type, but rather employed a ground launch vehicle (GLV) Ron also used for his Dragonfly aerotug. The glider was positioned on the GLV and launched exactly as if an aerotug were performing the towing. The tow vehicle was positioned about 200 feet down the field from the glider and the appropriate brake pressure was then set. The vehicle would accelerate, pulling the glider and GLV, and once the glider was airborne the tow would continue as a typical "truck tow."

The tow bridle on the glider was also similar to those typically used with aerotowing. It consisted of a line attached to the keel in front of the hang point which extended forward and was routed through a ring attached to the end of the tow rope. It was then directed back toward the pilot where it was tied to a weak link which in turn was captured by the first string of the release mechanism. The release was a two-string type release positioned several feet in front of the pilot and attached to a short line fastened to each shoulder strap on the harness. It is believed that Ron's usual aerotow weak link of 140 pounds was being used.

The flight plan for this flight as well as the six previous training flights, and on prior occasions, was for the truck to drive to a predetermined point, pull to the side and stop. The pilot would reach approximately 100 feet of altitude, then release and promptly land in the direction of tow further down the field.

On Ron's ill-fated flight the launch commenced with no problem, and the truck drove to the stop point and turned right about 90 degrees and off the mowed tow strip. However there was a malfunction with the release mechanism and Ron was unable to release the tow rope. As he flew past the truck at about 100 feet of altitude, he signaled to the winch operator to drop the drag brake pressure which was promptly done. Ron continued past the truck and was still at an estimated 40-50 feet of altitude when he reached the end of the tow rope. It was observed that the glider suddenly pitched down severely and very quickly nosed into the ground with a very intense impact. Witnesses believe that Ron managed to grab the release and was in the process of manually clearing the malfunction when the rope went tight, and he may have only had one hand on the control bar at that time. When assistance reached Ron moments later, it was noted that the release and tow line were disconnected, separated a couple of feet with the weak link intact.

It is concluded that even with the winch brake released, some rope tension was able to develop since the rope exited the drum at about a 35-40 degree angle, and then wrapped partly around a glider rack support at the left rear corner of the truck. The tow bridle, attached at the keel and shoulder straps, would have consequently been pulled down and around the control bar and then back to the tow rope. As some tension developed, the control bar was pulled back quite far and quickly caused the glider to dive. The forces required for this would have been low, and even a very low breaking point on the weak link most likely would not have prevented the dive.

It should also be noted that Ron's usual procedure included mounting a hook knife at the winch when towing, but it had been stolen several weeks earlier and not yet replaced. In addition, Ron normally flew with a second hook knife sewn on his harness, but he had elected to use his spaghetti harness for this flight which didn't have a knife.

An ambulance was summoned within about five minutes of the accident at 7:19 PM and arrived on the scene at 7:36 PM according to Franklin County Ambulance dispatch records. Another 10-15 minutes was required to get him prepared for transport, anti-shock trousers applied and IV's started. Wisely, a second ambulance stood by on the adjoining road in case the first became stuck while in the field. He was transported about 15 miles to the small local hospital. Doctors there requested a helicopter to transport him to a trauma center in St. Louis but Ron passed away just prior to being moved to the helicopter.

Follow up analysis and testing of the release mechanism utilized on this flight suggest two possible explanations for the release failure. The release mechanism, shown in the attached illustration, was constructed of polypropylene webbing with a 3.5-inch-long piece of vinyl fabric sewn to the webbing to form a tube that would hold the pin. One end of the pin had a loop to which was attached a trip string consisting of four-millimeter nylon parachute shroud line. The other end of the pin was readily exposed after it was inserted through the loop of the number tow string, and the trip line could potentially get hooked over this end of the pin. Pulling the trip line would then tend to cause the pin to be further engaged into the number two string loop instead of being pulled free. A fairly fresh tear about one inch in the length of the fabric holding the pin was noted. If this failure mode occurred and the trip line was pulled very aggressively, it is conceivable that the pin could have been pulled forward hard enough to produce this tear. Of course a host of other possible causes for the tear exist.

The second possible failure mode was confirmed through load testing. After having been loaded to 100 pounds, this release required an average load of 36 pounds to cause it to separate after the pin had been pulled free. This was observed on six consecutive tests with the data having a standard deviation of 2.7 pounds. Given that the release was at one end of the bridle line and the other was attached to the keel, a tow line tension of about 70 pounds or so (two times the separating force of the release) would have been required to separate the release after a 200-pound tow force. Seventy pounds would have been more than enough force to "stuff" the control bar causing the glider to dive.

COMMENTS ABOUT THE ACCIDENT

Ron had a sincere interest in promoting safe flight and it was this attitude that made this event so surprising. It also dictates an obligation on our part to learn from this and share that new knowledge to avoid a repeat occurrence. We owe it to Ron. We owe it to the sport.

These comments should not be construed as criticisms of Ron or anyone else. In fact, some of these things have been seen before but we have failed to integrate them into our thinking or understand their extreme consequences.

1) Emergency medical response: We all know the importance of good trauma care within the "Golden Hour" after significant injury, but many of us don't have a plan to respond efficiently. So, know where and how you will summon emergency assistance at all flying sites. Have accurate city/county road names and number so you don't need instructions referencing barns or rusted tractors. Especially in remote rural locations, have the latitude and longitude coordinates for your sites as well. Should a severe accident occur, this information can be relayed to a helicopter ambulance pilot who can then enter it into his Loran or GPS navigation system and fly directly to your location. This information can be found on aeronautic sectional charts or on U.S. Geological Survey topographical maps. Also check with the local emergency medical services so that you understand the procedure required to dispatch a helicopter; it's often not as simple as saying, "Send a helicopter!"

2) Hook knife: We've heard this before, and now the importance should be understood. Have one at the tow vehicle and fly with one in easy reach. When learning to fly did you execute a perfect launch the first time? Probably not; it took practice to get it right. Are you likely to get it right the first time using a hook knife or deploying a parachute in a panic situation? Hang in a simulator and practice cutting an old line; it's not as easy as you might think. This should become a standard part of towing instruction.

3) Emergency procedure: What are the best actions to take if the release fails to separate while in flight? Develop procedures APPROPRIATE FOR EACH OF YOUR PARTICULAR METHODS OF TOWING and practice these ahead of time. For example: it has been suggested that if a release fails, the pilot should overfly the tow vehicle at a high airspeed, and when he gets to the end of the rope, break the weak link. Obviously, this procedure is highly dangerous if you are using a tow bridle system that attaches to the keel or is routed over the control bar (common with foot launch towing and aerotowing), and is probably ill-advised for other setups such as those in which the tow rope has significant stretch, since this would absorb the shock and reduce the likelihood of the weak link breaking. These procedures should be discussed with all pilots new to your towing community, and periodically within your regular group for memory review and potential revision.

4) Good quality release mechanism: This seems obvious, but what is a good release that performs reliably? There are HGMA standards for testing a hang glider to assess its stability and structural integrity. Similarly, there is a need for performance standards against which releases can be tested. I will soon be publishing recommendations which have been endorsed by the USHGA towing committee.



(Smith Release

*WARNING*
THIS DESIGN IS NOT ONE TO DUPLICATE! IT REPRESENTS A DESIGN WITH RELEASE RELIABILITY PROBLEMS.

BRIDLE
WEAK LINK
#1 STRING (130 POUND DACRON LINE)
#2 STRING (4 mm PARACHUTE SHROUD LINE)
1/4" I.D. BRASS GROMMET
POLYPROPYLENE WEBBING - 1" WIDE
6" PIN (COAT HANGER)
TEAR
TRIP LINE (4 mm PARACHUTE SHROUD LINE)
TO SHOULDER STRAPS

WE Bryden
1992/10/18)

Contact:
Bill Bryden, Examiner/Tow Supervisor
1924 W. Highland, Columbus, IN 47201
(812) 372-4101.--Ed.

Freakin' breath of fresh air reading something that sounds like it was written by a human with the intent of conveying undecimated information with no ass covering.

Note that while this two-string release is a somewhat moronic piece o' crap it's nothing on the scale that Kelly's was.
- solo (versus tandem) glider
- towline tension split nearly in half by the two point (aerotow) bridle
- protected by a pathetic standard aerotow weak link

On the other hand... These assholes are releasing from the bottom minus even a top secondary release and/or weak link - which idiot fucking Bill doesn't see worthy of so much as a single comment.

[Tad Eareckson]

Jean Dry Lakebed Accident Report and Analysis - 2015/05/11

Dear Tandem / Tow pilot,

In USHPA's ongoing effort to improve the safety of the sport, we are notifying all tandem and tow rated pilots of the facts of a recent hang gliding tandem/towing fatality. USHPA's purpose in providing this information to you is to assist you in better evaluating the risks that exist in the sport of hang gliding, particularly those risks that apply to tandem and towing flights, so that you can take measures to reduce those risks in your own flights.

What the fuck does this incident have to do with TANDEM? Let alone TANDEM *INSTRUCTION* which is the entire pretense for the tandem EXEMPTION?

Here are your only two references to the "student":

At 2:43PM on Friday March 27, 2015, Master rated hang glider pilot, Advanced Instructor and Tandem Instructor Kelly Harrison perished with his 11 year old student during a tandem hang gliding flight.

But the release did not activate and they impacted the ground.

So what was it his eleven year old student learned before, during, after the flight other than how to impact the ground and perish? He's undoubtedly been briefed as part of the "class" and his mother / waiver signer, also part of the class, thinks they're getting a skydiving lesson (which they actually kinda were - minus the parachute part).

At no time do you report that he had any influence on / participation in the flight other than as an unspecified weight of ballast. Not one touch of the control bar at any time during the climb, descent, or plummet. And we know from the (Bo Hagewood) / Michael Elliot, Bill Bennett / Mike Del Signore, Arlan Birkett / Jeremiah Thompson fatality reports and accounts just how much you motherfuckers enjoy placing as much blame as possible on the student.

You beat us to death referring to Kelly - eleven times - as the "tandem instructor". But nowhere in either the product of your extensive investigation or the mainstream media firestorm following the crash to we hear a syllable's worth of indication that any actual instruction was committed.

The glider isn't even designated as a tandem - just a wing with a 185 to 440 hook-in weight range specification.

How would this flight have started, proceeded, ended the least bit differently had it been Kelly solo on a Falcon 170 or 195 with the same wheels and extensions?

Addressing this as a tandem flight and putting tandem "instructors" on the list of privileged information recipients and decimators makes about as much sense addressing the Jim Freer, Kevin O'Brien, Joe Julik fatalities as towing incidents - or Zack Marzec as a free flight.

The vast majority of tow flights and ratings are aero and this incident isn't all that relevant to aero. Nobody's circuit or step towing on scooter either. And very few platform launchers are circuit towing. So what's the purpose of having all these assholes on the list of privileged information recipients and decimators?

Tandem "instructors" are damn near all towers 'cause the "instructional" flights are damn near all thrill rides and damn near all thrill rides are towed 'cause the turnaround is so fast, cheap, and easy. And pretty much all tandem "instructors" are tandem "instructors" 'cause ya only need an IQ of fifteen to do the job and that's all they've got. Stuff that requires reading, writing, 'rithmetic is permanently far beyond their reach.

Kelly got his tickets from you highly discriminating geniuses and was a Master level pilot - signed off by Joe Greblo, the best of the best where C's are concerned - and Advanced Tandem Instructor with lotsa merit badges before you shredded all his ratings a day or two after impact. And he was too stupid to:
- put a mirror on his truck
- hire a competent driver
- avail himself of any half decent surface tow release technology
- recognize the lethal threat presented by extended wheels in a tow - 'specially circuit - operation:
-- despite the 1992/09/10 Ron Smith fatality report
-- which should've been blindingly obvious anyway to anyone with a tenth of a brain or and ounce and a half of common sense or better
- hook up an idiot-proof two string release without turning it into a locking mechanism
- duct tape a hook knife to his downtube within easier reach
- communicate to his students that he wasn't taking them up for a skydiving lesson
- radio his driver that he still had a glider behind him when he veered of into the middle of the lakebed for line recovery
- attempt to abort the tow when it became obvious that they wouldn't be able to continue it the better part of a minute prior to lockout onset
- radio his driver prior to attempting to abort the tow
- go for his chute when he realized his release was jammed
- have instructed his driver to swallow the video card in the event of a disaster such as this

So what great new ideas are you expecting to emerge from this great intellectual horsepower resource you have in your pool of selective privileged information decimators? It's been four weeks since the date on this report - and near two and a half months since the impact and point at which some of your more unruly members started speculating.

Maybe we should be looking at some of the really great innovations from our previous thirty years of truck and other flavors of towing we've been steadily advancing, perfecting. Can you get us started? All that are coming to me at the moment:

- typical two string surface tow release system

- typical two loop / four strand weak link for tandem surface tow operations properly installed and positioned between the tow bridle and the tow line

- typical razor-sharp cutting tool to slash through lines in an instant

Seems to me that typical will be the quality we'll most need to emulate. Makes total sense since typical is the way we want these flights to go - not national news making. And, hell, typically is the way you're responding to this one. So it's hard to imagine the results we'll get will be anything other than typical. I have a good feeling about this sport's future.

[Tad Eareckson]

Jump to next post:
http://www.kitestrings.org/post7970.html#p7970

Jean Dry Lakebed Accident Report and Analysis - 2015/05/11

Several times during the flight, the tandem instructor was observed making radio communications to the tow vehicle operator through a hand held radio (mounted on his right shoulder strap) that had been radio checked just prior to the flight.

But I just can't figure out why when the tow vehicle began turning for the downwind leg of the tow and the glider continued flying upwind the tandem instructor wasn't observed making radio communications to the tow vehicle operator through the handheld radio (mounted on his right shoulder strap) that had been radio checked just prior to the flight and report that the glider wasn't responding to the tandem instructor's control input to get it to follow the tow vehicle after it began turning for the downwind leg of the counterclockwise circuit tow around the lakebed that was a typical operation for pilots in the area.

And then a little bit later when the lockout developed after slack quickly came out of the towline and the bridle came into contact with the glider's control frame and the tandem instructor attempted to release from the towline by pulling on the lanyard connected to the release pin of the typical two-string surface tow release system didn't respond to the tandem instructor's input either and the typical two loop / four strand weak link for tandem surface tow operations that was properly installed and positioned between the tow bridle and the towline was failing to fulfill its purpose of increasing the safety of the towing operation and the tandem instructor again wasn't observed making radio communications to the tow vehicle operator through the handheld radio (mounted on the tandem instructor's right shoulder strap) that had been radio checked just prior to the flight.

This totally mystifies me. What was the tandem instructor talking about earlier in the flight when the tandem instructor was observed making radio communications to the tow vehicle operator through the handheld radio (mounted on the tandem instructor's right shoulder strap) that had been radio checked just prior to the flight that was of more importance than what was happening in the final minute or so of the flight? Not to forget to begin turning for the downwind leg of the counterclockwise circuit tow around the lakebed that was a typical operation for pilots in the area?

The tandem instructor has a wire running from the PTT button on the tandem instructor's finger up the tandem instructor's sleeve to the headset installed in the tandem instructor full face helmet, right? Ya think the tandem instructor ran the radio battery down too much earlier in the flight when the tandem instructor was observed making radio communications to the tow vehicle operator through the handheld radio (mounted on the tandem instructor's right shoulder strap) that had been radio checked just prior to the flight?

Is there ANY chance you can decimate just a clip of the privileged onboard video showing one of the several times during the flight that the tandem instructor was observed making radio communications to the tow vehicle operator through the handheld radio (mounted on the tandem instructor's right shoulder strap) that had been radio checked just prior to the flight so that perhaps we might be able to respond to your active solicitations for our thoughts and ideas as we use the lessons learned to develop the operations advisory bulletin to help our other pilots and students avoid similar fates?

No? We don't have high enough privileged information clearances to rate such a decimation?

Eh, what the fuck. I have a video of the tandem instructor's that was uploaded the day before the tandem instructor perished with the tandem instructor's eleven year old student during the tandem hang gliding flight that I'll be more than happy to decimate.

http://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=10205503639723814

(URLs for full resolution.)

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- -0 - minutes
- 50 - seconds
- 11 - frame (30 fps)

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Any thoughts or ideas, people of varying ages, on this issue as we use the lessons learned to develop the operations advisory bulletin to help our other pilots and students avoid similar fates?
---
In case anybody's having trouble seeing what's going to...

- We start at the last frame Kelly's right hand is planted on the control frame (downtube). He then fumbles around a bit making the easy reach to the handheld radio (mounted on his right shoulder strap) that had been radio checked just prior to the flight. By about 05226 he has his grip on the thing and operates it as a handheld radio (mounted on his right shoulder strap). (The transmission appears to continue to and beyond the final frame in that clip of the video.) In other words his radio was just as useful in the emergency as were the typical two-string surface tow release system and the typical two loop / four strand weak link for tandem surface tow operations that was properly installed and positioned between the tow bridle and the towline.

If the motherfucker had bothered to do the radio right this would've been a nonevent. But u$hPa - big surprise - obscures this issue as much as it possibly can, reminds us that there was no secondary spotter and makes not a single mention of the radio issue having been a problem or any recommendation that a useable radio be considered of the slightest use. 'Cause these pigfuckers can't afford to have anybody understanding that this kid was smashed to death in front of his family for want of this fifty dollar fix - thirty percent of the cost of the kid's thrill ride ticket.

Jump to top:
http://www.kitestrings.org/post7968.html#p7968

[Tad Eareckson]

Jean Dry Lakebed Accident Report and Analysis - 2015/05/11

Several times during the flight, the tandem instructor was observed making radio communications to the tow vehicle operator through a hand held radio (mounted on his right shoulder strap) that had been radio checked just prior to the flight.

Wow, the tandem instructor RADIO checked the handheld RADIO (mounted on his right shoulder strap) just prior to the flight? That sounds like a really conscientious operation. Lotsa these fly-by-knight dumps will vario, altimeter, or GPS check the radio just prior to the flight.

How 'bout the glider? Was the tandem instructor also observed several times making control inputs to the glider (mounted on his top harness strap) and tethered to tow vehicle operator through a rope that was glider checked just prior to the flight?

What's the point in decimating any of this privileged information to us muppets?

If the tandem instructor was observed making radio communications to the tow vehicle operator through a hand held radio (mounted on his right shoulder strap) then we know the fucking radio was working. Why do we need to know it was checked just prior to the flight?

The fact that the tandem instructor radio checked the perfectly good radio just prior to the flight balances out the fact that the tandem instructor fucked up his piece o' shit release and didn't bother to release check his piece o' shit release just prior to the flight?

You attach ZERO importance to the radio. You don't:

- tell us:

-- what the communications:
--- were - almost certainly about tension adjustment, possibly glider position and truck speed
--- tended to be in the course of normal tows

-- whether or not any communications were made as the tow deteriorated from normal through problematic to critical - almost certainly not 'cause the driver very obviously has no fuckin' clue as to what's going on with the glider during this period (not to mention the detail that there's no fuckin' way Kelly would've been able to use the radio in any situation which would've required him to have been flying the fuckin' glider)

-- how a radio could possibly have made any difference (read: improvement) in the outcome as the tow vehicle operator was obviously operating the tow vehicle not just flawlessly but typically (having a fuckin' clue what's going on with the glider is of no importance with regard to the tow vehicle operator's actions 'cause a fundamental tenet of our sport is that the tandem instructor is solely responsible for the safety of his glider (unless we can figure out some way to blame his student))

- even mention radios in your list of likely recommendations let alone advise use and standard procedures

So tell me sumpin', motherfuckers...

The first indication of the lockout to the tow vehicle operator was seeing the glider impact the ground.

How can you NOT recommend bulletproof communications and/or signaling between the two people managing the energy in a tow flight?

[Tad Eareckson]

Jean Dry Lakebed Accident Report and Analysis - 2015/05/11

Immediately upon learning of this accident, USHPA's Hang Gliding Chair of the Accident Reporting Committee assembled a special ad hoc committee to gather facts and assist local officials in their investigation of this accident. The committee members visited the scene, met with local law enforcement, reviewed the flight instrument track log, reviewed onboard- and ground-based videos, reviewed witness testimony, reviewed accident scene photos taken by local law enforcement at the scene, and inspected all the equipment involved. From this investigation, the committee was able to determine the following facts.

Which - in case you missed it, people of varying ages, as Yours Truly very stupidly did on the first cycle - is another way of saying that immediately upon learning of this accident USHPA's Hang Gliding Chair of the Accident Reporting Committee and his assembled special ad hoc committee to gather facts and assist local officials in their investigation of this accident determined to make damn sure to have ZERO contact - personal, telephone, online - with ANY actual witnesses to the crash, particularly the:

- truck driver who served both as the driver and winch operator, with control over the tow pressure control mechanism from inside the cab of the tow vehicle

- fictitious primary spotter

They had EVERYTHING they needed from the local law enforcement transcripts.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnYC5BXdt48
12-year-old killed in hang glider accident

KTNV Channel 13 Las Vegas - 2015/03/27

Bryan Callahan

The FAA WAS notified of the crash and did help with the investigation but Metro says because the glider didn't have a tail number and there was a truck pulling it at the time Metro is going to handle the investigation.

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http://www.fox5vegas.com/story/28635734/child-pilot-killed-in-hang-gliding-accident-near-jean#ixzz3aJz9nom5
Child, pilot killed in hang gliding accident near Jean ID'd - FOX5 Vegas - KVVU

Capt. Peter M. Boffelli, Jr. - 2015/03/27
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department - Traffic Bureau

The glider was supposed to release the tether from the truck itself. Apparently that tether release did not occur. So what occurred was when that truck turned around thinking that the tether was released the glider itself plummeted straight to the ground.

http://www.scrippsmedia.com/ktnv/news/Friend-of-hang-gliding-instructor-speaks-out-297904581.html
Friend of hang gliding instructor speaks out - http://www.ktnv.com

Elizabeth Gadley - 2015/03/28

The FAA was notified as well about the crash, but the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department is handling the investigation because the hang glider was not registered with the FAA and was being towed by a truck.

(Ya think these ace Vegas traffic cops checked to make sure the turn signals and brake lights were functioning properly?)

They actually had WAY MORE information from the local law enforcement transcripts than they needed or wanted to know - just in the little detail about that truck turning around thinking that the tether was released.

Where do the lies begin and end with this atrocity? At THIS:

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=32681
Tandem crash in LV (speculation thread)

Mark G. Forbes - 2015/03/30 23:29:59 UTC

Please, no speculation

Hi folks,

I understand the interest in learning the cause of this, but could we please not speculate on the forum? We have a very experienced tow administrator (Mitch Shipley) headed to Las Vegas to do an accident investigation, and when we learn what really happened we'll convey that information to our members. He'll be working with two of the local instructors there to get to the truth.

Meanwhile, please refrain from offering speculation or opinion on what might have happened, what might have been theoretically done to prevent it and so on. Emotions are raw, people are hurting, and uninformed speculation doesn't help anybody. News reports are of little use since they're written by people who have no idea how our sport works or what is typical.

Thanks for your understanding and patience.

point these u$hPa motherfuckers already know that they will NOT be having ANY contact with ANYBODY who'd been within a twenty-five mile radius of the Jean Dry Lake Bed on 2015/03/27 prior to an hour after impact. They're not only gonna make sure they don't talk to the tow vehicle operator - they're gonna make sure they have no more idea of who he was than we recipients of the decimated privileged information. And fuck the only other eyewitnesses - the family members who've already dispersed to Farmington and Pahrump.

They're gonna be getting to "the truth" by reviewing the reports filed by traffic cops and decimating what they find in those with the goal of presenting this tow as being as "TYPICAL" as possible. Everything being done pretty much right but all these risks inherent in all forms of aviation just happened to line up in this...

This accident demonstrates a "perfect storm" of multiple factors where the elimination of any one or two of them might have prevented the fatal result. Although tandem hang gliding fatalities are exceptionally rare, the rarity of such events should not give you any comfort. Instead, you should review your own tandem and towing operational practices to see where you can take steps to decrease the inherent risks.

..."perfect storm" event. Good luck in reviewing your own tandem and towing operational practices to see where you can take steps to decrease the inherent risks (read: DOING *NOTHING*).

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=27396
Scooter tow faillure... or Never Land On Your Face

Mitch Shipley - 2012/10/22 19:04:16 UTC

We engage in a sport that has risk and that is part of the attraction.

Shit happens, people of varying ages. Nuthin' much anybody can do about it. If there were we'd have done it already. Love it or leave it. Don't like the odds? Stay home and play checkers.

[Tad Eareckson]

Jump to next post:
http://www.kitestrings.org/post7993.html#p7993

Jean Dry Lakebed Accident Report and Analysis - 2015/05/11

Immediately upon learning of this accident, USHPA's Hang Gliding Chair of the Accident Reporting Committee assembled a special ad hoc committee to gather facts and assist local officials in their investigation of this accident.

How's the local officials' investigation coming along?

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They had all that firepower available to swarm the crash and rendezvous sites but after over two and a half months they can't put out a report comparable to the one you did in one and a half? They don't have the resources? They were overwhelmed by the load of data they collected? There've been other hang and para glider surface towing crashes at Jean Lake which commanded higher priority? They need more assistance from u$hPa's Hang Gliding Chair of the Accident Reporting Committee and the special ad hoc committee he assembled to gather facts and assist local officials in their investigation of this accident?

The committee members visited the scene...

What did they find that we muppets didn't have better information on from the Day One news shots? The tow rig was long gone, were the wreckage...

KSNV-9-24015-6


...and Kelly's body still in situ? Did they have somebody stationed out there to keep the ravens and coyotes away pending their arrival? If you found anything useful how come you didn't show us any pictures or reference anything in the report? We hear NOTHING about:
- how the glider hit
- glider damage
- injuries to the tandem instructor and his eleven year old student who also perished

All you've told us is that the glider impacted the ground. And almost all of us had figured that out already by about halfway through Week Two.

...met with local law enforcement...

Why? Did they find themselves in need of having some local laws enforced?

I remember some rumors being circulated in the mainstream media that Kelly was in violation of FEDERAL regulations regarding needing a permit to operate a commercial operation on BLM turf but that didn't seem to be any importance at that point to anybody but Bob Show Scott - certainly to no SANE person.

So what's the deal with local law enforcement? The truck driver who served both as the driver and winch operator, with control over the tow pressure control mechanism from inside the cab of the tow vehicle, had a suspended license? Do you NEED a license to drive a pickup truck around on a dry lakebed?

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Javier Gomez
dirt biker

We were very concerned that anybody would speed where kids are actually, uh, dirt biking. Uh... But as we find out, I guess, uh, it was, uh, for a good reason. As soon as he told me there was a kid, uh, that may have been involved in this accident I am heartbroken.

Doesn't sound like you need them for motorcycles.

If the mission is INVESTIGATION why aren't they meeting with INVESTIGATORS?

But in any case... How long did these meetings tend to be? What was gained from them by either or both of the sides involved? Can you point to something - ANYTHING - in the report?

...reviewed the flight instrument track log, reviewed onboard- and ground-based videos...

Why is there a hyphen after "onboard"?

...reviewed witness testimony...

GREAT! REVIEWING witness testimony is so much more efficient in terms of time, effort, expense than MEETING witnesses and asking the kinds of questions u$hPa's Hang Gliding Chair of the Accident Reporting Committee and the special ad hoc committee he assembled to gather facts and assist local officials in their investigation of this accident might ask!

So after they REVIEWED this witness testimony did they find it acceptable? Or did they suggest some editing, revisions, omissions, amendments that would better assist local officials in their investigation and help them produce a more acceptable result?

...reviewed accident scene photos taken by local law enforcement at the scene...

- After one definite and one probable body had been separated from the wreckage, the twenty-four hundred feet of free towline had been cut off the winch, and the tow rig had been converted to ad hoc ambulance mode and driven out of the lakebed and eleven miles up the Interstate back towards Vegas.

- Did anybody get a good photo of the typical two string surface tow release system? Or did the card get too loaded up with shots of the hook knife before they could get that far down in the priorities sequence?

...and inspected all the equipment involved.

Really? They REVIEWED the flight instrument track log, REVIEWED onboard- and ground-based videos, REVIEWED witness testimony, REVIEWED accident scene photos taken by local law enforcement at the scene... But INSPECTED all the equipment involved? I'd a thunk that they'd have been so wired into REVIEWING stuff by that point that it would've been a no brainer to maintain their rhythm and just REVIEW all the equipment involved. What was the point? Hadn't the local officials ALREADY viewed all the equipment involved?

From this investigation, the committee was able to determine the following facts.

Yeah, let's take a look at one of them...

The tow vehicle then began turning for the downwind leg of the tow as the glider continued flying upwind.

That "FACT" flatly, totally, unequivocally contradicts the one the local officials, from whom you got ONE HUNDRED PERCENT of your relevant information - ALL of it second hand, determined on Day One within a couple hours of impact:

07-04707
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Capt. Peter Boffelli

The glider was supposed to release the tether from the truck itself. Apparently that tether release did not occur. So what occurred was when that truck turned around thinking that the tether was released the glider itself plummeted straight to the ground.

They put THEIR facts out for the world to see and discuss on Day One. You put yours out with a secret code shared with only about a half dozen privileged information decimators and an admonition that they be shared with NO ONE. And we're supposed to believe your facts over theirs?

There's no fuckin' way your bullshit story lines up with the data:

http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8857/18290284792_24ac8847ee_o.png


or any stretch of common sense.

The traffic cops' story is bullshit too. The glider WAS supposed to release the tether from the truck itself but most assuredly and very obviously not when the truck was assuming it had - whether the tow was supposed to be just an upwindish run or a counterclockwise circuit around the lakebed that was a typical operation for pilots in the area.

That story too has been deliberately doctored - by whom and for what purpose(s) I can't tell.

No! Belay that! In the course of putting the following together I figured out EXACTLY what these motherfuckers are doing and why.

There's no question that the driver mistakenly believed that the tether had been released from the glider. Every shred of evidence we have is consistent with that. But how and why does he reach that conclusion? He's got a couple hundred pounds of mostly backwards pull on him as the glider's climbing steadily in smooth air and he abruptly stops feeling it, concludes with dead certainty that the tow's over, and kicks into line recovery mode without the slightest hesitation?

And everybody else in the thrill rider contingent was clued in to what was supposed to be going on so poorly that in the fifty-three second period between the shift to recovery mode and the plummet onset nobody suspected that anything was amiss?

The glider was supposed to release the tether from the truck itself. Apparently that tether release did not occur. So what occurred was when that truck turned around thinking that the tether was released the glider itself plummeted straight to the ground.

Bullshit.

The glider was supposed to release the tether from the truck itself.

The glider WASN'T supposed to release the tether from the truck itself. The fuckin' glider was SUPPOSED to max out the climb. We're definitely into max out the blame-the-dead-guy mode here. The truck did everything HE was supposed to but the glider had dropped the ball.

The fuckin' truck's sole function is to support the fuckin' glider and react optimally to what's going on with it. It's not the other way around. That tour group wasn't there for $139 truck rides around the lakebed.

Apparently that tether release did not occur.

"APPARENTLY", Cap'n Pete? Ya think maybe? We all can plainly see from this crappy news chopper shot:

07-03019
http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8737/16790136379_c1c17b2f86_o.png


that that tether release MOST ASSUREDLY did not OCCUR. And when you guys were at the scene of the crime you saw twenty-four hundred feet of two thousand pound Spectra running from the glider to the point in the middle of the lakebed at which the truck had just realized he'd smashed his glider into the ground.

And all you keenly intellectual crack CSI guys...

KSNV-8-21819-1


...also very obviously had a damn good look at the idiot-proof state-of-the-art typical two string surface tow release system at the core of this clusterfuck disaster. And ya don't gotta be a fuckin' rocket scientist to see how one of those is supposed to work and how it's been hooked up so's it CAN'T. This is why not only do we not have a photo of the typical two string surface tow release system at the core of this clusterfuck disaster, we don't even have a vague DESCRIPTION of the issue. Instead we get THIS:

Post-accident inspection of the release showed the release pin still in place. A temporary repair was in place on the bridle's release pin lanyard arrangement. The release pin was prevented from being retracted by that temporary repair which routed the release pin lanyard in a fashion requiring exceptional force to affect a release. Inspectors on the ground were able to activate the release following the accident only by the application of exceptional force.

infuriating useless deliberate total crap.

So what occurred...

You're sure now. You don't wanna preface that with "APPARENTLY"?

...was when that truck turned around thinking that the tether was released...

Like it was SUPPOSED TO BE. That way we don't hafta delve into any issues of WHY the truck was thinking that the tether was released. Blame the dead guy for everything.

...the glider itself plummeted straight to the ground.

Yeah. The glider ITSELF plummeted straight to the ground. You couldn't just say "The glider plummeted straight to the ground." Stay on the blame-the-dead-guy message. Avoid the truth, that the fuckin' truck PULLED the fuckin' glider straight into the ground - the ten year old kid kite flyer common sense shit.

This started being a damage control / cover-up operation before the dust had settled - not just by u$hPa and the local glider folk but the government as well. Same deal as when my Vancouver Sun hook-in check article was killed. Vegas is NOTHING BUT tourist / thrill ride / family fun industry. This kid:

http://farm8.staticflickr.com/7597/16975005972_c450d2cdda_o.png


didn't get killed because any incompetence, negligence, oversight failure, dereliction of duty at any institutional level. He got killed because he glider was supposed to release the tether from the truck itself and apparently that tether release did not occur. The driver doesn't get so much as a parking ticket's worth of charge out of the deal 'cause he did absolutely nothing wrong and we don't wanna see him publicly testifying under oath about any actual relevant FACTS.

One guy fucked up a bit but, fuck, he's dead. Self correcting problem, everything's fine again now. Check out some of our summer discount vacation packages at:

http://www.whathappensinvegas.com

This whole thing stinks to the point of suffocation at every conceivable level. Fuck you and your cover-up squad, Cap'n Pete.

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[Tad Eareckson]

u$hPa - 2015/05/11

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They don't bother to switch off the fuckin' photo icons.

T** at K*** S****** - 2015/03/30 19:59:55 UTC

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u$hPa - 2015/05/11

http://farm9.staticflickr.com/8857/18290284792_24ac8847ee_o.png

They don't bother to center and optimize the fit of the fuckin' lakebed.

T** at K*** S****** - 2015/03/30 19:59:55 UTC

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Trivial shit? If you like. But aviation - not to mention life in general - is about doing things right and striving for excellence. If people are doing shit jobs with the minor stuff it's a no brainer that you can expect the same at all other levels. (Like the way I brushed the Google Earth logos out from the lower altitude shots? (Sorry, Google Earth, but they're in the high stuff so folk know who to credit.))

The photos are perfect matches for the writing. Take any solid information that you don't have any real choice about making available and adulterate it with as much clutter, obfuscation, misdirection as possible.