Something of a continuation from:
http://www.kitestrings.org/post12249.html#p12249
Joe Gregor - 2006/01
SUMMARY REPORT:
2005/10/01 / approximately 14:00
Whitwell, Tennessee
52-year-old male, H-3
Wills Wing Sport 2
High Energy Tracer
Charlie Insider
SSE at 5-7 mph; nearly straight in and smooth
A new intermediate rated pilot participating in his first hang gliding competition launched from a modified cliff-launch site and became separated from the glider seconds after launching. The pilot fell approximately 300 feet into mature hardwoods and died immediately due to severe blunt-force trauma. Witnesses state that the pilot was asked by several people just prior to launching if he needed a hang check, and he responded in the negative.
Conditions: The accident flight was initiated from a SE-facing cliff-launch site. Winds were SSE at 5-7, essentially straight in and light.
Logbook: The accident pilot held a USHGA H-3 rating (obtained in March, 2005) with the following special skill signoffs: AT, FL, PL, ST, and TURB. Detailed logbook information is not available, but still the vast majority of his time and training had been obtained via aerotow. The accident pilot had reportedly just discovered mountain flying, having logged roughly 12 flights at four different sites.
Medical: There were no known preexisting physical conditions or illnesses prior to the accident flight. The accident pilot appeared to be in good spirits, although a bit nervous as it was his first hang gliding competition.
Synopsis: The accident pilot - who was reportedly eager to get into the air - carried his glider to the launch point and set it down tail to the wind. He walked out to launch to look at conditions and was told they were fine. At this point no one had yet launched. A call for wind dummies was made, and the meet director was assessing conditions while awaiting volunteer non-competition pilots to arrive and perform the first launches. The accident pilot checked his harness points (parachute handle, leg straps, hook knife, etc.) assiduously. At least one witness stated that the accident pilot appeared a bit nervous both in this situation and before, while setting up his glider. When he went to his glider to get ready, one pilot who had been talking with him said, "Be sure to do a hang check." The accident pilot spent some time under his glider while it was turned around. He then lifted it, turned 180 degrees to face the ramp, and was met by a side wire crew. At this point his team leader told the accident pilot, "Do a hang check." The wire crewman on the right side reported that, after subsequently setting the glider down, the accident pilot started adjusting his VG rope and talking to the crew about how to give him feedback.
The accident pilot picked up his glider and proceeded to the launch point. Several pilots present at the scene reported they checked his hang point and it looked like he was hooked in. Several pilots present at the scene reported that there were four or five other individuals who said, "Do a hang check," or "Have you done a hang check?" In no case was it reported that he responded directly.
Conditions were pronounced fine and the accident pilot cleared his launch. He launched using the grapevine grip and the glider dove as soon as he put weight on it. Two videos of the launch clearly show that he rotated his hands to the beer-bottle grip as soon as he started running and the glider lifted.
The glider disappeared from view but soon reappeared going nearly straight up, reached an apex, stalled, yawed to the side, and went back down nearly vertically. Witness reports and later review of two videos taken of the launch indicate that the accident pilot had lost his grip on the glider as soon as it began pulling out from the dive. He was carried on a trajectory that sent him past the trees below launch and it was estimated that he fell approximately 300 feet. He died upon impact.
Airframe: Damage to the glider is consistent with mild impact and recovery from a tree landing. Hang strap and carabiner were both found in good condition and disconnected from one another. The parachute, a PDA-22 manufactured by Free Flight, was found in good condition still inside the deployment bag.
Analysis: No electronically recorded flight information (GPS or barograph) was available for analysis in this accident. As a result we are left with eyewitness accounts and post-crash damage analysis in order to determine what likely occurred in this accident. Sadly, the probable cause in this incident seems relatively certain.
A post incident continuity check was performed on the accident pilot's harness and glider. The glider hang strap and the carabiner were both found intact with no sign of stress. A photograph, taken just before the accident pilot launched, showed that the carabiner was actually clipped to the pilot's harness under his arm. The accident pilot was flying a Sport 2 glider with a High Energy harness. The normal white Wills Wing hang strap is a non-standard length. As a result, he had a black extension strap hooked to his glider's hang strap. The black extension strap was long enough and of the proper color to make it appear, upon a cursory inspection, that the pilot was actually attached to his wing. The black colored carabiner did not stand out against the dark colored harness and could have easily been overlooked. Several pilots reported seeing him hooked in, indicating that they had mistaken the black extension strap for his harness main strap.
The accident pilot had experienced a failure-to-hook-in event two weeks prior to this accident while attempting flight from a local ramp-launch site. He was challenged at launch by another pilot who, grabbing his nose wires, saw that the accident pilot wasn't hooked in and said: "Do you want a hang check?" The accident pilot refused this and three additional increasingly emphatic offers to perform a hang check before he was told to examine his carabiner, to discover that he was not yet hooked into his glider. The accident pilot never made comment on this incident at any time after his successful ridge-soaring flight.
Probable Cause: Failure to hook into the glider prior to launch. Failure to complete a full and complete hang check just prior to launching.
Discussion: Launching is one of the most dangerous phases of flight for a hang glider pilot. This is doubly true if the glider is mis-assembled prior to flight. For a hang glider, the harness serves the same function as the cockpit and fuselage of a conventional aircraft. Ensuring that the glider is airworthy requires a preflight check that cannot be completely performed while the glider is still partially assembled. Until the harness is attached to the wing, the glider is still only partially assembled. Performing a final hang check just prior to flight is the only way to ensure that the glider is completely assembled and airworthy. The final hang check must therefore be performed meticulously and religiously. Pilots who, for whatever reason, delay assembly or partially disassemble their glider (unhooking and remaining in the harness) while waiting at launch are at increased risk for launching a non-airworthy aircraft.
Having and maintaining a strict routine is of extreme importance to any pilot. The accident pilot may have been nervous due to his inexperience with mountain launches and his relative lack of competition experience. The latter is an important point because competition has a tendency to increase the tension and the distraction level (even though this was a low key "fun" meet.) Additionally this was a new site to this pilot, and he was flying with some new and less-than-familiar electronic equipment. All of these factors can serve to break a pilot's routine. Pilots flying under conditions that break their normal routine must exercise vigilance to ensure that all required checks are successfully completed prior to flight.
The accident pilot had trained and flown primarily via aerotow. He was relatively new to mountain flying and his background may have been a factor in this accident. The routine developed for performing a pre-flight safety check is different when launching from a dolly via aerotow vs. launching from a mountain site - increasing the potential for the pilot to make a serious oversight impacting safety of flight. Pilots experienced and confident in one launch method or maneuver should be cognizant of the fact that their skills and abilities may not be at the same level when performing a new launch method or maneuver.
Recommendation: Always perform a full and complete hang check just prior to launching. Pilots should make full use of their wire crew, when available, to assist in evaluating their aircraft (glider and harness) for airworthiness prior to launching.
Techniques, such as the so-called "Aussie technique" of completely assembling the glider before pre-flight and not removing the harness until flight is complete, can be used to eliminate one common failure mode - that of unhooking from the glider and failing to properly hook back in prior to launching.
Another technique that can be used to eliminate critical errors is the religious use of checklists and standardized procedures. Over the century-long course of manned-aviation history, maintaining a strict routine and standardized procedure has proven a potent safety multiplier. Hang glider pilots experience a much wider range of conditions during take-off, approach, and landing than do most pilots of conventional aircraft. Additionally, the individualist nature of our sport does not lend well to efforts at standardization. This puts hang glider pilots at significantly increased risk compared to their fixed-wing brethren, and this risk must be managed intelligently and professionally. Since our aircraft are so simple, use of a written checklist has proven unnecessary for most pilots. This, unfortunately, makes us vulnerable to making critical omissions when conditions cause a break in our individual routine. Alarm bells should go off in our heads when we note a break in our routine. One way to manage this risk is to limit changes to equipment, flying sites, venue, and flying tasks to one element at a time. If you decide to fly a new site, for instance, avoid doing so with a brand-new harness or wing.
One important technique for managing risk at launch is to always make efficient use of any available ground crew. The pilot in command bears sole responsibility for the safe conduct of his or her flight. Thus, performing a full and complete hang check just prior to flight is the sole responsibility of the pilot in command. In discharging this responsibility, pilots should make maximum use of available ground crew to help ensure that whatever checks they routinely perform have been successfully completed prior to flight.
Recommendation: Event organizers should encourage all pilots involved in an event to demonstrate that their aircraft is airworthy just prior to flight as a condition for launching during the event.
While the pilot in command bears sole responsibility for performing all required checks, accurately judging conditions, and conducting a safe flight, it behooves everyone to do what they can to help fellow pilots achieve these goals. The wide range of operating conditions and flying equipment, the self-imposed lack of standardized operating practices, and the understandable pre-occupation we all have ensuring the safe conduct of our
own flight, makes this an extremely difficult task for the community. Organized events, however, provide a more controlled and constrained environment, one where procedures could be implemented that would significantly enhance safety. While several people reportedly challenged the pilot to confirm that he had performed a hang check, and had glanced at his equipment to see if everything looked OK, no one demanded to observe a full and complete hang check as a condition of helping him launch. Had such a demand been made, and the accident pilot complied, this accident would never have occurred.
Photos: Dean Funk
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C.J. Sturtevant
A previous Master's Tips column by Rob Kells (page 56 in last month's issue) also addresses dealing with distractions during pre-flight, and offers suggestions on how to ensure that pilot and glider are firmly connected before committing aviation. It's worth rereading.
How come you don't show them this:
10-05124
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launch photo? Too horrifying for a family publication?
A new intermediate rated pilot participating in his first hang gliding competition...
- And our first misrepresentation. Don't worry, Joe. Plenty of room left for more. No, he was about to serve as a wind dummy. It's a real stretch to say that that constitutes participating in a comp. More akin to a Turkey Vulture (what hang glider people refer to as a "bird") that had happened to cruise by out in front at about that time.
- So who rated him? u$hPa has an "Instructor of the Year" award program to recognize the best of the best. How come we never get told anything about the signatures on the rating cards of the stars of your fatality reports? Afraid we might start detecting patterns you don't want us to detect?
...launched from a modified cliff-launch site and became separated from the glider seconds after launching.
- How can one become separated from something to which one was never connected in the first place? Are we wording it this way to help shield the launch crew from charges of culpability?
- See? The Turkey Vulture would've worked a lot better. And they wouldn't have had to recover what was left of Bill and his minorly damaged glider (from quite separate locations) and scrub the first day.
- This is a garden variety unhooked launch incident that just happened to occur at an extremely unforgiving mountain site. We've had them since the beginning of time, our training programs have never done shit to effectively address the issue, they're common as dirt, why is it that this one needs a book in the way of an incident report? Whether it's off a vertical cliff and results in a three hundred foot plummet or on a shallow dune with barely noticeable consequences it's the same mistake. If this fatal plummet needs a book then so does the one that was noticed and rectified in the space of fifteen seconds.
Oh right, this one's all about ass covering, politics, pretending to do something of actual value. Pray continue.
The pilot...
The PILOT? He never even made it to passenger status.
...fell approximately 300 feet into mature hardwoods...
Pity they weren't immature hardwoods. Immature hardwoods will flex a lot more - give one a fighting chance.
...and died immediately due to severe blunt-force trauma.
- Are we're absolutely POSITIVE that the butler didn't do it and rig things to make it look like an accident?
- We're not allowed to say that anymore. It was found to be much more effective if we report that the pilot "suffered fatal injuries". There's no suffering involved in dying immediately due to severe blunt-force trauma so people don't take those reports as seriously.
Witnesses state that the pilot was asked by several people just prior to launching if he needed a hang check, and he responded in the negative.
- Bullshit. Regardless of whether you're talking about a hang glider, Cessna, F/A-18, 747, Space Shuttle "just prior to launching" means SECONDS in the low single digit range. And that also means from launch position - obviously. We have NO REPORT that anybody communicated anything to anyone about his connection status subsequent to some unspecified point in his approach to launch position. And in approaches to ramps there are damn good reasons for pilots to NOT be connected to their gliders. At Glacier and Makapu'u hooked in approaches aren't permitted or done. And nobody's ever launched unhooked from either of those sites.
- That was one thing he got right that day. The only people who come anywhere close to needing hang checks are the ones about to fly new harness/glider configurations.
- Witnesses state that? Sounds like the several people who asked him just prior to launching if he needed a hang check weren't all that keen to acknowledge that they hadn't looked to see whether or not he was actually hooked in.
- A hang check can't be done just prior to launching. A hook-in check can be done just prior to and often as the pilot's launching.
Logbook: The accident pilot held a USHGA H-3 rating (obtained in March, 2005) with the following special skill signoffs: AT, FL, PL, ST, and TURB.
- By whom? Shouldn't we know the identity of his instructor(s) and/or ratings official(s) so's we can pay all the appropriate compliments? I guess the fact that the motherfucker has never published a single word on this one anywhere on any medium tells us everything we really need to know.
- Wasn't this guy's instructor also the instructor who trained and signed off the Three who was half killed in similar nothing conditions at his operation on an AT launch effort eighteen weeks prior? u$hPa's 2004 Instructor of the Year? Maybe we should do some serious thinking about selecting him again for 2005 to make it blindingly clear to all the stupid muppets out there that there's absolutely no correlation between quality of hang gliding instruction and the survival rates of those signed off for various ratings and skills. Then maybe another article explaining exactly what a rating's supposed to qualify us to do.
- Where's the CL rating? Whitwell requires a Three with Cliff Launch. If he didn't have one then fine. An Observer could've signed him off for the one he was about to do. And it's hard to imagine a more appropriate launch site than Whitwell for that one. And any competent Observer would've caught the empty hang strap. And if the Observer HADN'T caught the empty hang strap then he'd have been almost as screwed as Steve Parson and Jon Orders were. Not to mention u$hPa.
Detailed logbook information is not available...
- Really? You just told us:
Logbook:
You just saw his bare bones logbook but the detailed one he'd left at home and u$hPa was never able to obtain access? From his sister's posting on the Capitol Club rag I'da thunk that the family would've wanted it fully available.
- Why not? Bill's buddies packed up all his gear and personal items for the sad trip back north. A log isn't a personal diary whose contents are considered private. It's a supposed to be documentation of the pilot's flying experience and intended to present to anyone who asked. In conventional aviation it's documentation of experience and currency for ratings and licensing. In hang gliding it's supposed to be the same. Bill would've been racking up hours to qualify for a Four at this point.
And it's pretty clear that two weekends prior Bill was approaching the south ramp at McConnellsburg unhooked, assuming he wasn't, and intending to launch. If that had been documented and checked it could have defused this situation. And if it hadn't been documented that would've told us something about how well our system's working.
...but still the vast majority of his time and training had been obtained via aerotow.
- Manquin right? Max elevation: 58 feet MSL. Min elevation 54 feet MSL. Whitwell: Launch: 2115 MSL, LZ: 740 MSL. Pity Steve couldn't be bothered to chime in on this one, give us a little more background.
- Do we have any information on whether or not Bill had successfully completed the short clinic Steve offers to qualify AT pilots to go up pro toad? I would assume so because a Three qualifies one to participate in u$hPa Nationals comps, Davis only permits competitors to fly with appropriate bridles and weak links, and no two point bridle has ever been qualified as appropriate.
- AT huh? So immediately prior to launch - not to mention during - your suspension is fully loaded so an unhooked launch is a physical impossibility. Not much relevant to learn from that environment then.
- So who cleared him for hill, mountain, ramp, cliff launch environments and what do we know about the relevant training? No, wait! There's no detailed logbook information available so we have absolutely no way of knowing or learning anything from that front. DAMN!
The accident pilot had reportedly just discovered mountain flying, having logged roughly 12 flights at four different sites.
- He just DISCOVERED it? All by himself? And here I was thinking that u$hPa pilots were supposed to be trained, mentored, guided along as they advanced from the early dunes, training hill, scooter stuff.
- Really hard to believe that he DISCOVERED mountain flying - at some point in 2005 I'd guess. I'd been under the impression that people had been flying mountains pretty regularly since the early Seventies on.
- Had he just "discovered" aerotowing the way he discovered mountain flying? Or was there a more formal process involved?
- Everybody and his dog knows that towing is hundreds of times more dangerous than mountain flying - due to all the extreme complexity involved. Funny the way he seems to have survived all the flatland stuff minus a single reported scratch but gets extremely terminally splattered before pulling off much more than a dozen mountain launches. Any thoughts on that?
- And I guess it would be way to much trouble to tell us what those sites were. I have him:
-- 2005/07/03 - Hyner
-- 2005/07/04 - Jacks
-- 2005/09/17-18 - McConnellsburg
Woodstock would be a good bet for the other one.
Medical: There were no known preexisting physical conditions or illnesses prior to the accident flight.
- How 'bout afterwards?
- Good thing you pointed that out for us, Joe. In just about all every unhooked launch incident I've read about there was a preexisting physical condition or illness prior to the accident flight which was found to be a major contributing factor at a minimum. And way more often than not the smoking gun. Poor depth perception is almost always a biggie.
The accident pilot appeared to be in good spirits, although a bit nervous as it was his first hang gliding competition.
- He wasn't in the competition. What was he supposed to have been nervous about? And given that it was noticed that he was nervous, pretty new to mountain flying, shouldn't someone not terribly pressed for time have checked him out and stayed with him for the three or four minutes it would've taken to get him safely airborne?
- Pity nobody else in that total clusterfuck of an operation was the slightest bit nervous about the first launch of the event being attempted by a nervous low mountain time new Three without a Cliff Launch rating.
Synopsis: The accident pilot - who was reportedly eager to get into the air - carried his glider to the launch point and set it down tail to the wind. He walked out to launch to look at conditions and was told they were fine.
- Cliff launch. SSE at 5-7 mph; nearly straight in and smooth. Did he really need to be told the conditions were fine?
- Did anybody remind him that he was about to run off a cliff and needed to be absolutely certain he was connected to his glider immediately prior? Did anybody advise him to stand close to the edge, look down, think about what the consequences of an unhooked launch would likely be?
- Scratch that. What he really needed to be absolutely certain of was that he WASN'T connected to his glider - regardless of whether or not he actually wasn't.
http://ozreport.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=13132
Unhooked Death Again - Change our Methods Now?
Quinn Cornwell - 2009/01/24 19:57:03 UTC
HPAC Accident Review and Safety Committee Chairman
No, don't think about the jagged boulders. That'll mess with your head. Don't ever tell pilots to think about "Oh, if you screw this up, you'll crash and burn into those jagged rocks down there, so make sure you don't screw this up." This sort of psychology is detrimental. It's good to be conscience of the dangers in hang gliding, pointing this out right before you start running is just plain stupid.
Don't worry, Quinn. Nobody messed with his head and his launch was confident, flawless, textbook. He died only because of an issue related to assembly and preflight - absolutely nothing to do with his physical execution of the task.
At this point no one had yet launched. A call for wind dummies was made...
- Presumably by an individual involved in the running of the comp. Care to tell us who?
...and the meet director was assessing conditions...
...from way back behind launch where he would've had no chance to spot an unhooked launch situation about to erupt. But if that hadn't happened he'd have done a great job in assessing the conditions safe for launch and likely soarable.
...while awaiting volunteer non-competition pilots to arrive and perform the first launches.
So much for Bill - this was his first competition.
The accident pilot checked his harness points (parachute handle, leg straps, hook knife, etc.) assiduously.
- Good job. Ya just never know when your hook knife is gonna be a critical issue.
- I wonder how things might have gone if we'd have made him leave his parachute, hook knife, etc. back at Henson. Maybe he'd have gotten bored and started thinking about other issues.
At least one witness stated that the accident pilot appeared a bit nervous both in this situation and before, while setting up his glider.
Pity nobody else was - with respect to what would be the first - and last - launch of the day.
When he went to his glider to get ready, one pilot who had been talking with him said...
"I'm pretty well prepped and you're about to wind dummy. I'll stick with you, help wire you into position, make sure you get off OK. OK?" Just kidding.
..."Be sure to do a hang check."
Why? IS that a u$hPa SOP or was it a mandatory meet protocol? Why are individuals telling him this? Surely the Meet Head called all the participants - competitors and wind dummies - together for a proper briefing well prior to any possibility of any launches.
After your glider's fully assembled and preflighted move it and your harness to the staging area. Wind dummies first. Mike here - everybody see Mike? - will be today's launch director. After you're hooked in and ready to go he'll give a final check thirty feet behind launch and serve as your port wire crewman. Conditions are currently pretty mellow but if/as shit starts cycling we'll recruit volunteers for starboard.
And note that we'll actually be complying with u$hPa's quarter century old hook-in check mandate. And no, that doesn't mean a hang check. If you need to check your bar clearance do it in the staging area. And if you need to do it and have forgotten to it you'll be sent back to the staging area so you don't hold up the pilots who've managed to make it that far with their shit together.
Any questions? Good. Wind dummy launch window opens in fifteen minutes.
So how come that didn't happen? And how come you're conspicuously not reporting that that didn't happen? And let's say that the launch wouldn't have been a 100.00 percent death sentence like Whitwell or Henson. Let's say that it was something like:
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That still gums up the works, takes a glider out of commission probably for the duration, wrecks someone's experience, provides a point of negative publicity.
The accident pilot spent some time under his glider while it was turned around. He then lifted it...
How high? If you lift it a few extra inches you can find out whether or not you're connected and have your leg loops. How come NOT ONCE in this shit heap of an "accident" report do you make that point?
...turned 180 degrees to face the ramp, and was met by a side wire crew.
A SIDE wire crew? Cliff launch, SSE at 5-7... Where else would we have put crew?
At this point his team leader...
He was a wind dummy. Tell me how he had a team leader. And as a wind dummy he should've been under the control of / reporting to the Meet Head and flying for the equal benefit of all teams and individual competitors. And the Meet Head should've announced to all the regular participants, teams, team leaders that the dummy would shortly be launching so that anybody interested could observe the launch and get a feel for what the air was doing. Duh.
...told the accident pilot, "Do a hang check."
- Who was "his team leader"? Shouldn't he be publicly recognized so we can all thank him for the stellar job he did in almost preventing this unhooked launch fatality?
- How 'bout the conspicuously unidentified Meet Head? (Dean Funk) Or is everybody just supposed to do whatever some other meet participant tells him to?
- So the "side wire crew" obviously also heard the accident pilot's team leader telling him, "Do a hang check." and clearly observed the accident pilot NOT do a hang check and didn't bother to look to see whether or not...
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...he was actually connected to his fucking glider. And I wonder why NOTHING has been said about the qualifications of the "side wire crew" - which was obviously two individuals in these conditions. Also so reported by Scott.
They're taking on responsibility for the safety of the launch. They aid the (presumed) pilot to keep the glider level and pointed into the wind and need to be able to let go on command and not reconnect inappropriately. And they were clearly in excellent positions to visually assess Bill's connection status while Bill himself had zilch of same.
But do continue telling us NOTHING about the qualifications of any of the total incompetent bozos running this horror show. We'd much rather hear descriptions of the trees through which he plummeted on the slope three hundred feet below launch. Maybe a paragraph or two on the best forest management strategies for mitigating the consequences of unhooked launches.
- This:
http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1166
Thoughts on responsibility...
Scott Wilkinson - 2005/10/05 14:10:56 UTC
We visited Steve Wendt yesterday, who was visibly choked up over Bill's death. For Steve, it all comes down to one thing: you've got to hook in. Period.
is about everything we ever got - indirectly - from Bill's exceptionally knowledgeable ace instructor. Doesn't say anything about a hang check. Says you've got to hook in - period. And nobody's who's hooked in has ever launched unhooked, right Joe? And even fewer individuals who've hooked in AND done a hang check have ever launched unhooked. The record's crystal clear on this.
The accident pilot picked up his glider and proceeded to the launch point. Several pilots present at the scene reported they checked his hang point and it looked like he was hooked in.
- Oh really. The Sport 2 uses kingpost suspension. So tell me how one can check the "hang point" and reach a conclusion that the prospective pilot is probably hooked in. 'Specially with suspension we know was never for a single millisecond under an ounce of tension.
Tell me how, even if the suspension had been conventional direct-to-the-keel, one could look at the hang point and come away with enhanced confidence that the pilot was hooked in.
The only way anyone can gain some confidence that ANYONE is hooked in at ANY moment his to check the CARABINER. And since that's a device that only about five or ten percent of the hang gliding population can even spell correctly I'm not seeing much hope there.
And...
- Seeing the carabiner properly connected while the pilot is prepping for launch should imbue one with ZERO confidence that the carabiner will be connected at the moment of launch.
- A properly connected carabiner may be of ZERO use to the pilot if he hasn't made it through at least one leg loop.
- If you have a shitload of "pilots" present at the scene reporting that they checked his hang point and it looked like he was hooked in then you have a serious competence problem and should scrub the meet and all further flying till at least next spring after you've gotten people properly qualified to fly hang gliders.
- I guess the several pilots present at the scene also reported that they checked his hang point and it looked like Bill's carabiner was locked - 'cause we all know how obsessive idiot hang glider people are about that issue.
Several pilots present at the scene reported that there were for or five other individuals who said, "Do a hang check," or "Have you done a hang check?" In no case was it reported that he responded directly.
- Sounds like everybody 'cept Bill went above and beyond the call of duty to ensure this launch would go off as safely and smoothly as humanly possible.
- And if he'd said, "Yep, taken care of two minutes ago. I NEVER pick up a hang glider and start moving to launch before I've done a hang check." then everything would've been fine and we wouldn't all be sitting here reading this bullshit report. We could've used this magazine space for a discussion of the best material and knots to use to construct a really consistent aerotow weak link - one that meets our expectation of failing as needed to protect the equipment, not failing inadvertently or inconsistently. A weak link that will break as early as possible in lockout situations, but be strong and reliable enough to avoid frequent breaks from turbulence. (Somehow managed to miss your comments on that article, Joe.)
- OK, all these individual nobody participants are all hyper about Bill getting his stupid hang check. So how come the Meet Head didn't designate a staging point immediately behind launch at which a hang check would be mandatory? There might even be a case to be made for something like that given that individuals might be using new, swapped, borrowed equipment so it wouldn't hurt to check clearances. And maybe they'd find people hanging a bit high or low and be able to make recommendations and effect adjustments.
The glider disappeared from view but soon reappeared going nearly straight up, reached an apex, stalled, yawed to the side, and went back down nearly vertically.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2mX2HNwVr9g
Hang Gliding Fail
andyh0p - 2011/04/24 - dead
03-0325 - 06-0511
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18-0919 - 21-1025[/quote][/quote]18-3507
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He was carried on a trajectory that sent him past the trees below launch and it was estimated that he fell approximately 300 feet. He died upon impact.
Good thing he had a backup loop. I shudder to think how things would've almost certainly ended otherwise.
No electronically recorded flight information (GPS or barograph) was available for analysis in this accident.
Guess we'll never really be able to understand what happened and why then.
As a result we are left with eyewitness accounts and post-crash damage analysis in order to determine what likely occurred in this accident.
Thank God. I'm at a total loss at this point.
As a result, he had a black extension strap hooked to his glider's hang strap. The black extension strap was long enough and of the proper color to make it appear, upon a cursory inspection, that the pilot was actually attached to his wing.
- What a bitch. Normally cursory inspections of our gear do just fine - sidewires for example.
- They saw an untensioned white factory hang strap with nothing obvious connected to it and were satisfied that he was safely and securely attached to his glider. Yeah, that sorta configuration would've totally baffled all but the very best of us.
The black colored carabiner did not stand out against the dark colored harness and could have easily been overlooked.
- And I guess the regular flavor carabiners would be lost to view hooked to gray and silver colored harnesses. A real can of worms hitherto unconsidered. Great work Joe.
Here's a thought... Mandate matching colors for harnesses and their carabiners. That would get people out of the habit doing cursory inspections to verify fellow pilots' connection statuses.
- Great job lowering the bar to the extent that everybody at this event 'cept Bill performed to the max that could be reasonably expected of any fellow pilot. Me... I'd tend to say that the assholes with multiples of Bill's experience and/or the advantages of being able to see him from behind and the sides were multiples more culpable than this poorly trained novice mountain flyer was. Probably at least half a dozen individuals advising him that he needed to perform a hang check, none of them were capable and/or motivated enough to determine whether or not he was actually hooked in. (Big surprise - the only way they themselves are capable of determining whether or not they themselves are actually hooked in is to get somebody on the nose so they can perform hang checks.)
- Another thought... And I'm totally one hundred percent serious about this one.
- No gliders from the staging area to launch with anybody hooked in. And no hang checks permitted at launch. If you need to do your stupid fucking hang check you do it at your setup space. If you arrive at launch not fully prepped you get sent to the back of the line and docked ten points for the round.
- In the staging area a meet staffer executes preflight sidewire stomp tests on all gliders - demonstrating for the less experienced pilots how to do them without grinding the wires into any of the numerous sharp rocks in the area. If any glider fails the test the team scores zero for the day.
- At launch the pilot hooks himself in, visually verifies the connection, gets confirmation from the launch director.
- Glider is lifted to tight suspension to verify connection and leg loops by:
-- pilot
-- wind
-- assistants
whatever it takes and is green for ten seconds. Again if conditions didn't permit on that effort.
We'd have a culture in which the assumption would be almost constantly that the pilot is NOT hooked in - versus the sewer we've always had before. Maybe shoot two or three Aussie Methodist douchebags to let them know we're serious. And note that we'd still have Craig Pirazzi around.
Being hooked into a glider anywhere 'cept in launch position and in the air is more dangerous - to both the human and the glider - than not being hooked in. But Aussie Methodists don't recognize the existences of dust devils, gust fronts, rotors.
The accident pilot had experienced a failure-to-hook-in event two weeks prior to this accident while attempting flight from a local ramp-launch site.
Which wasn't reported until 2005/10/03 15:13:27 UTC. Prior to that point probably only Bill, the two individuals wiring him up to the back of the old McConnellsburg ramp - Hank Hengst and Cragin Shelton, and Chris McKee who'd been on the ramp prepping to launch - were aware of the incident.
And I've only just realized that this incident occurred in the course of the annual McConnellsburg fly-in - big deal, lotsa stuff going on, great NW thermal conditions both days, hang and para, packed. You can check the Capitol Club rag traffic for that period - numerous references to Bill, not a whisper about this very serious incident. My guess is that it occurred on Day One, Saturday, 2005/09/17 - all the identified players 'cept for Cragin are documented.
He was challenged at launch by another pilot who, grabbing his nose wires, saw that the accident pilot wasn't hooked in and said: "Do you want a hang check?"
- Bullshit. This occurred behind the ramp as he was being wire assisted up the rather steep approach. That statement gives the impression that he was in launch position, ready to commit, when Hank spotted the empty strap and shut things down in the nick of time. (One wonders that if the scenario HAD played out that way whether Bill might have had enough of a fear inoculation for Whitwell to have gone off without incident.)
- Such a pity. Never once in the course of world hang gliding history has anyone who's had a hang check subsequently become separated from his glider during the ensuing flight or effort.
The accident pilot refused this and three additional increasingly emphatic offers to perform a hang check before he was told to examine his carabiner, to discover that he was not yet hooked into his glider.
- HOLY SHIT!!! It seems that it's possible for a pilot to determine whether or not he's hooked just by LOOKING AT his suspension - WITHOUT doing a hang check! Who'da thunk? We need to seriously consider the implications and maybe look into new strategies for dealing with this FTHI problem that's been plaguing us since the dawn of the sport.
- And here's what Rob had to say on the issue in previous month's magazine:
Rob Kells - 2005/12
Each of us agrees that it is not a particular method, but rather the fear of launching unhooked that makes us diligent to be sure we are hooked in every time before starting the launch run.
Anybody have a problem with that? Good. So here's what two of Yours Truly would've done in that situation...
We'd have assisted him up onto the ramp to launch position, followed all his instructions helped get him trimmed for launch with Yours Truly A on his nose and Yours Truly B on his slightly upwind wing, waited for him to clear his nose man.
Then Yours Truly A would've suggested, insisted if necessary, that he lift or let his wing float up to the point that the suspension went taut - just to get some reassurance that his bar clearance looked reasonable.
Then I'd have waited a couple minutes for the color to return, asked him if he'd ever heard of u$hPa's then near quarter century old hook-in check requirement, assured him that his just having come within two footsteps of certain death was not his fault - that it was, instead, the fault of his incompetent douchebag of an Instructor (of the Year) and the whole rotten u$hPa infrastructure above him.
And then I'd have encouraged him to take the flight when he felt ready - WITH THE FUCKIN' HOOK-IN CHECK this time.
And then there would've been a no-punches-pulled discussion of this incident on the Capitol Club wire. But without making Bill feel like an incompetent moron, letting him know that tons of Hang Four rockstars - Participant Pagen included - had made the same or a similar mistake. He was UNDOUBTEDLY deeply embarrassed about the McConnellsburg fuckup and that was probably a factor on this one. Things don't always work the way it seems they should.
Probable Cause: Failure to hook into the glider prior to launch. Failure to complete a full and complete hang check just prior to launching.
Definite Cause: Never once in the history of US hang gliding has a u$hPa certified instructor or ratings official taught, complied with, enforced, supported the hook-in check requirement that went on the books 1981/05 - at this point just a bit shy of four decades ago.
Tell us what a full and complete hang check is - motherfucker.
- carabiner connected and locked
- leg loops
- no twists
- main and backup
- a fist's worth of clearance
- helmet buckled
- parachute pins fully engaged
The CAUSE was that he ran off the fuckin' cliff without being connected to his fuckin' glider. PERIOD. WHY he wasn't connected to his fuckin' glider is an entirely separate issue. And it was supposed to have been dealt with by an SOP that had gone onto the books twenty-four years and five months earlier but not ONE SINGLE u$hPa douchebag instructor or other ratings official has EVER complied with it. THIS:
http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1166
Thoughts on responsibility...
Scott Wilkinson - 2005/10/05 14:10:56 UTC
We visited Steve Wendt yesterday, who was visibly choked up over Bill's death. For Steve, it all comes down to one thing: you've got to hook in. Period.
is his instructor and the asshole most responsible for Bill having run off the fuckin' cliff without being connected to his fuckin' glider. Also for demolishing Holly Korzilius launching from his Happy Acres putting green in similar zilch conditions 125 days, 1 hour, 45 minutes earlier while everybody was still hung over from celebrating his receipt of the 2004 u$hPa Instructor of the Year Award.
Discussion: Launching is one of the most dangerous phases of flight for a hang glider pilot.
Launching is one of the two most dangerous phases of flight for ANY AIRCRAFT - for reasons that are too fuckin' obvious to be worthy of discussion. But this is an issue pretty much unique to hang gliders and shouldn't be discussed or thought about in conventional terms.
Let's go with crossing a highway after coming to a stop at a sign or light. Ya look both ways IMMEDIATELY prior to initiating forward motion. Three minutes ago doesn't quite cut it.
Or hell, we can bring it back to aviation. 1977/03/27 - Tenerife. Two 747s, 583 fatalities, deadliest incident in aviation history. Shit visibility. You get clearance from the tower IMMEDIATELY prior to flooring it and you don't fuck around after you've been given the green.
This is doubly true if the glider is mis-assembled prior to flight.
Yeah Joe. If our glider is mis-assembled prior to flight we're TWICE as likely to experience really unpleasant consequences in our effort to get airborne. Bill got killed on one out of one launches in the course of this event. If everything had been put together properly his survival odds would've been even money for the first one.
Performing a final hang check just prior to flight is the only way to ensure that the glider is completely assembled and airworthy.
- Which is physically impossible to do just prior to flight.
- Yeah, can't be beat for ensuring that your sidewires are good to go.
- Bullshit.
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- How much extra do they pay you for writing totally moronic crap like that?
The final hang check must therefore be performed meticulously and religiously.
Fuck anybody who does ANYTHING in this game RELIGIOUSLY. Religion is how we got stuck with:
- Pagen
- Bobby Fucking-Genius Bailey
- Jim Keen-Intellect Rooney
- Focused Pilots
- perfectly timed landing flare
- floating crossbar
- Infallible Weak Link
- Reliable Release
- biannual sidewires replacement schedule
- Aussie Method
- Joe Greblo's Four or Five Cs
Also fuck meticulousness. Save it for design, engineering, construction, writing.
meticulous: - showing great attention to detail; very careful and precise: he had always been so meticulous about his appearance.
Meticulous is a virtual SYNONYM of...
assiduous: showing great care and perseverance: she was assiduous in pointing out every feature.
The accident pilot checked his harness points (parachute handle, leg straps, hook knife, etc.) assiduously.
Bill's meticulousness/assiduousness was a major factor in getting him killed. COMPETENT pilots are constantly assessing ACTUAL THREATS and either neutralizing them or preparing themselves to neutralize them. Our biggest threat on a foot launch is not being hooked in. You neutralize it by assuming you aren't and lifting the glider to make sure you are - once every three seconds or under while you're waiting for the air to straighten up. That's not a meticulousness thing - douchebag. That's a well founded fear response.
While Bill was ASSIDUOUSLY checking his parachute handle in the staging area behind launch he didn't think to pull it when he separated from his glider two seconds after clearing launch. And with at separation the better part of three hundred feet of air between him and the impact point he might have had a chance. If he'd thought of the option immediately the chute would've at least made it out of the container.
Pilots who, for whatever reason, delay assembly or partially disassemble their glider (unhooking and remaining in the harness) while waiting at launch are at increased risk for launching a non-airworthy aircraft.
Go fuck yourself, Joe. This is all stuff you're pulling outta your ass. The people who launch unhooked are the ones who are 100.00 percent positive they're hooked in. The ones who don't are the ones who are constantly scared shitless they're not right up to the point at which it's too late to do anything about it.
Having and maintaining a strict routine is of extreme importance to any pilot.
Got it. From this point on I'm gonna start maintaining strict routines 'cause I now understand how extremely important that is to all pilots.
Fuck the pilots with strict routines. The Columbia was preflighted, launched, flown, docked, landed, serviced using nothing but extremely strict routines. Also incinerated along with seven astronauts due to a known-by-everyone-and-his-dog issue 'cause the strict routines were fatally flawed. And it's a good bet that scores of strict routines could've been violated without results as catastrophic as they were on 2003/02/01.
Wow. A decade and a day prior to Zack Marzec - who was launching from pretty much within sight of the Columbia's launch and intended landing location. And Zack was also launching under strict routines that those total douchebags almost always managed to get away with. Extremely long track record with very strictly enforced procedures.
The accident pilot may have been nervous due to his inexperience with mountain launches and his relative lack of competition experience.
Yeah...
- He was new to mountain flying and under all those competition pressures that so stress out the wind dummies.
- His RELATIVE lack of competition experience. ZERO. Would've still been zero at the end of the week if all had gone well 'cause he wasn't competing.
Two weekends prior he almost certainly would've launched unhooked at McConnellsburg on a totally normal recreational flying day if he hadn't been caught by a wire assistant. So why spew this totally useless total speculation on his presumed state of mind due to presumed stresses of the circumstances at the time? Tell us about all the stresses...
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...B Asher was supposed to have been under during this exercise.
And as far as I'm concerned Bill was way less culpable than all the motherfuckers in the vicinity who could've checked and stopped him - just like at McConnellsburg with far fewer pairs of eyes around.
Pagen was there. He'd sent his glider off the hill without him at Morningside 1993/09/28 09:10 EST - a tiny bit over a dozen years prior - in total nothing circumstances. That was also a dozen years plus change subsequent to when u$hPa's hook-in check SOP was supposed to have been implemented. And Morningside was the point at which he started getting with the program.
So what was he doing at the time that was more important than observing the first wind dummy launch of the week's fun comp? He knew the danger and he knew that only a handful of glider people on the planet were implementing the procedure - and that ZERO commercial instructors were teaching it.
The latter is an important point...
Sure. You've said so. So obviously.
...because competition has a tendency to increase the tension and the distraction level (even though this was a low key "fun" meet.)
- But make sure to keep playing up the fake competition issue anyway 'cause it helps to fill up pages and distract from actual issues.
- What were the tension and the distraction levels at McConnellsburg two weekends prior when he was stopped by his crew from making the identical mistake? (Which wouldn't have been the first time that identical mistake had been committed at McConnellsburg on a run-of-the-mill rec flying weekend.)
Additionally this was a new site to this pilot, and he was flying with some new and less-than-familiar electronic equipment.
Pity he didn't have the experience of a Dennis Pagen, Bob Gillisse, Kunio Yoshimura, Jim Rooney, Jon Orders...
All of these factors can serve to break a pilot's routine.
He didn't have and wasn't taught any routine that complied with u$hPa SOPs.
Pilots flying under conditions that break their normal routine must exercise vigilance to ensure that all required checks are successfully completed prior to flight.
- All required checks... all battens secured, helmet buckled, hooked in, shoes tied, carabiner locked, radio frequency, sidewires replaced within the past six months... Any one of this issues could prove critical in some not easily predictable scenario.
- Truly inspirational advice, Joe. I'm sure that now pilots flying under conditions that break their normal routine will exercise vigilance to ensure that all required checks are successfully completed prior to flight.
The accident pilot had trained and flown primarily via aerotow. He was relatively new to mountain flying and his background may have been a factor in this accident.
And here I was thinking that we had a Pilot Proficiency Program in which pilots are supposed to be properly and thoroughly trained and qualified before being cleared to operate and fly in more demanding and potentially hazardous environments. Maybe we should start taking a look at the guy whose signature is on Bill's card.
No, wait. That was Steve Wendt who just months prior was recognized with u$hPa's Instructor of the Year Award. They were all at Manquin celebrating when Tex Forrest made a good decision in the favor of Holly Korzilius and left her half dead on the runway. And he's exceptionally knowledgeable. Hell, he's the one who signed Jim Rooney off on his instructor rating. (Speaking of unhooked launches.)
And you've told us that the accident pilot had reportedly just DISCOVERED mountain flying. He'd just heard about it from other pilots who occasionally fly Steve's Manquin scooter, platform, aero operation and thought it might be fun to give it a go - without receiving any relevant instruction whatsoever. And Steve was totally unaware of the fact that he'd started doing this. Same way he was totally unaware of the fact that Holly was gonna do a pro toad AT launch without taking the short clinic which he runs and mandates before anyone is permitted to hook up pro toad. It's a total miracle that he survived as long as he did in those mountain environments.
The routine developed for performing a pre-flight safety check is different when launching from a dolly via aerotow vs. launching from a mountain site - increasing the potential for the pilot to make a serious oversight impacting safety of flight.
Yeah, on an AT dolly launch there's no possibility of rolling off unhooked. Ya just gotta make sure you're using an appropriate weak link with a finished length of 1.5 inches or less and any releases are within easy reach.
Also AT launches are twenty times as dangerous as mountain launches due to all the additional complexity involved so his guard would've been way down.
Pilots experienced and confident in one launch method or maneuver should be cognizant of the fact that their skills and abilities may not be at the same level when performing a new launch method or maneuver.
Yeah Joe, that was the problem. Bill really didn't have the skills and abilities to ensure that he was hooked in prior to running off the cliff. And all the assholes packed together at the Whitwell launch didn't have the skills and abilities to notice that he wasn't hooked in prior to running off the cliff for his wind dummy exercise.
Recommendation: Always perform a full and complete hang check...
Define "a full and complete hang check". Show me the u$hPa SOP in which it's defined so's we can all get on the same page. Does it include making sure your helmet chinstrap is buckled? Or is that just a Grebloville thing?
...just prior to launching.
- Thanks Joe. He got that recommendation repeatedly within ten minutes of running off the cliff unhooked. But if assholes like you keep making it even more repeatedly it should start working even better.
- It is physically impossible to perform a full and complete hang check just prior to launching 'cause after you complete it you need to stand up, lift and trim the glider, clear you nose man, wait for a cycle. This is why people do hook-in checks to verify their connections - and their leg loops which the full and complete hang check DOESN'T - just prior to launch.
- How 'bout this, Joe?
Recommendation: Hook into your glider before running off a cliff with it.
Pilots should make full use of their wire crew, when available, to assist in evaluating their aircraft (glider and harness) for airworthiness prior to launching.
- You sound a lot like Rooney would if you multiplied his IQ by a factor of five or six. I wonder how you feel about yourself spewing crap like that.
- But do make an effort to assemble your wire crew with something better than the useless dregs Bill had at his disposal.
- Tell me why someone who needs assistance in evaluating his aircraft (glider and harness) for airworthiness prior to launching has any fucking business launching. Bill Priday was signed off to be able to do all this shit by u$hPa's 2004 Instructor of the Year Steve Exceptionally-Knowledgeable Wendt. Why do you think he wasn't able to? Doesn't the fact that he wasn't - twice within the span of three weekends - tell us that the entire system is totally shitrigged?
- If we get a do-over on this one with only the option of eliminating the crew we eliminate the crew. The results couldn't get any worse and minus a crew there's a fair chance that he feels less secure. And that's exactly what we need him to be feeling.
- We have at least one major glider manufacturer factory fixing its suspension spreaders like:
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and hotshot jock douchebags like Chris Valley taking things a step further like:
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Maybe you could provide us with a list of a dozen trustworthy individuals scattered around the country we can use as reliable consultants.
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6. What you're saying is that Bill's u$hPa instructor - one of the best of the best in the history of the sport - is incapable of reliably training his products how to run off cliffs while secured to their gliders. Maybe we'll get lucky with whatever we have available for a crew. Russian roulette. Yeah, I totally agree. That system needs to be shut down. Eliminate certified instruction and the Pilot Proficiency System. Let individuals purchase equipment, adhere to FAA regs, decide for themselves what they're qualified to do. Kite Strings provides any instruction information you wanna name for free. Or they can go to Red Howard and help us get the gene pool cleaned up a little faster.
Techniques, such as the so-called "Aussie technique" of completely assembling the glider before pre-flight and not removing the harness until flight is complete, can be used to eliminate one common failure mode - that of unhooking from the glider and failing to properly hook back in prior to launching.
Yeah, they CAN...
http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=13359
Today was a bad day!
Mike Bomstad - 2009/08/26 04:21:15 UTC
The harness is part of the aircraft... end of story.
(Just because it's easy to remove, does not mean it should be. Dont choose the path of least resistance)
Attach it to the wing, completing the aircraft.... then preflight the completed aircraft.
Buckle yourself into the cockpit and then your ready.
But they...
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...DON'T.
Another technique that can be used to eliminate critical errors is the religious use of checklists...
Bullshit.
Religion has ZERO place in aviation. Save it for praying for full and speedy recoveries after it's too late to do anything of legitimate value. Checklists are read and adhered to by humans. Humans miss items on checklists probably even more easily and frequently than they do on the real deal. I personally sat on the back of the pickup Bill's ace instructor - Steve Exceptionally-Knowledgeable Wendt - was using for a platform launch.
01-0000
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Steve started going down the half dozen item checklist, skipped right over "DISENGAGE NOSE SAFETY", gave his driver the green. As we were accelerating I reached up and disengaged the nose safety. And it just now occurs to me that if Steve HADN'T been using the checklist he probably WOULDN'T have missed the nose safety.
(By the way, Joe... Any thoughts on how Steve managed to tow this guy into an abrupt lockout in nothing conditions on a payout rig?)
I used a checklist at setup at Ridgely to help me to help me efficiently stage sequences, keep gear organized and properly stowed. Ditto for breakdown. All chickenshit stuff. And it got folded back up and went back into my wallet before I hiked my glider and harness across the taxiway and to the back of the launch line. And it stayed there until breakdown.
Never once in history of the sport has anyone said, "Came within an inch of launching unhooked Saturday. THANK GOD I had my checklist with me!" And nobody on a launch crew has ever caught an FTHI situation thanks to his checklist. Ditto for any of these stupid...
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...Rebar Dan DeWeese bricks.
...and standardized procedures.
Not to be confused with u$hPa's Standard Operating Procedures which state:
With each flight, demonstrates a method of establishing that the pilot is hooked in just prior to launch.
Just some more bullshit you're gonna throw out for us to help take up space in u$hPa's bullshit magazine.
Over the century-long course of manned-aviation history, maintaining a strict routine and standardized procedure has proven a potent safety multiplier. Hang glider pilots experience a much wider range of conditions during take-off, approach, and landing than do most pilots of conventional aircraft. Additionally, the individualist nature of our sport does not lend well to efforts at standardization.
And yet from the early Nineties until early last decade we all flew AT with the 1.0 G 130 pound Greenspot Standard Aerotow Weak Link - regardless of glider model, hook-in weight, flying weight, bridle configuration, experience level, currency, conditions, FAA AT regulations, resulting levels of carnage. Then shortly after the afternoon of 2013/02/02 Davis and his Flight Park Mafia buddies decided we'd be happier being able to choose between 140 and 200.
The individualist nature of our sport...
Really gotta admire the individualist nature of our sport. And fuck those efforts at standardization. If standardization was what we wanted we'd all be flying sailplanes. (Instead of sitting around waiting for relights watching our sport and flight parks going extinct.)
And where the hell were you for any of that shit?
The individualist nature of our sport...
...one pilot who had been talking with him said, "Be sure to do a hang check."
At this point his team leader told the accident pilot, "Do a hang check."
Several pilots present at the scene reported that there were four or five other individuals who said, "Do a hang check," or "Have you done a hang check?"
Several pilots present at the scene reported they checked his hang point and it looked like he was hooked in.
http://ozreport.com/12.081
Weaklinks - the HGFA rules
Davis Straub - 2008/04/22 14:47:00 UTC
Getting pilots into the air quickly is also safer as it reduces the stress that pilots feel on the ground and keeps them focused on their job which is to launch safely and without hassling the ground crew or themselves. When we look at safety we have to look at the whole system, not just one component of that system. One pilot may feel that one component is unsafe from his point of view and desire a different approach, but accommodating one pilot can reduce the overall safety of the system.
Yeah, right.
This puts hang glider pilots at significantly increased risk compared to their fixed-wing brethren...
Got news for ya, Joe...
fixed-wing - denoting aircraft of the conventional type as opposed to those with rotating wings, such as helicopters.
Hang gliders are FIXED-WING aircraft. Ditto for sailplanes - even though they ALSO unfix their wings to get to, from, back to the airport.
...and this risk must be managed intelligently and professionally.
Oh, we're gonna start managing risk intelligently and professionally. I can hardly wait. (And if you were all that fucking intelligent and professional you'd know what fixed-wing aircraft are.)
By the way... Hang gliding isn't supposed to be a flavor of professional aviation. It's supposed to be strictly recreational. But over the decades all the sleazebags who've infiltrated it have found avenues for fine-printing their way around that designation...
http://ozreport.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=24846
Is this a joke ?
Jim Rooney - 2011/08/25 04:55:25 UTC
It always amazes to hear know it all pilots arguing with the professional pilots.
I mean seriously, this is our job.
We do more tows in a day than they do in a month (year for most).
We *might* have an idea of how this stuff works.
They *might* do well to listen.
Not that they will, mind you... cuz they *know*.
I mean seriously... ridgerodent's going to inform me as to what Kroop has to say on this? Seriously? Steve's a good friend of mine. I've worked at Quest with him. We've had this discussion ... IN PERSON. And many other ones that get misunderstood by the general public. It's laughable.
...and have thus destroyed it.
Since our aircraft are so simple, use of a written checklist has proven unnecessary for most pilots.
Name some for whom it's proven necessary. Let's put Rafi Lavin on a Wills Wing glider. Did he skip the sidewire stomp test because it slipped his mind? If only he'd been using a written checklist?
I'll tell ya one thing about the guys with checklists - like Greg Porter - and gadgets - like Harry Martin. They're not gonna launch unhooked. And that's not 'cause their checklists and/or gadgets are gonna catch the relevant issues. Notice the way nobody's ever credited one with a save. They have the checklists and/or gadgets 'cause they know they're capable of and are afraid of doing it.
Rob Kells - 2005/12
Each of us agrees that it is not a particular method, but rather the fear of launching unhooked that makes us diligent to be sure we are hooked in every time before starting the launch run.
The Aussie Methodist assholes don't stop themselves or their flying buddies from launching unhooked because they have a proven system that works.
This, unfortunately, makes us vulnerable to making critical omissions when conditions cause a break in our individual routine. Alarm bells should go off in our heads when we note a break in our routine.
Fuck our routines - 'specially our routines in environments in which FTHI is an actual issue. Our "routines" are broken and different every time we fly. Our setup locations are different, we often fly different gliders and harnesses, we're layering up with different clothing for different conditions, we're getting called on to help maneuver gliders onto launch and crew. Launch windows close and reopen as winds ramp up, lull, shift direction.
We finish getting our battens stuffed, wing tensioned, stomp tested, instruments and cameras set... It ain't all that complicated, significant mistakes are hard to miss, and if you're too fuckin' stupid to verify your connection within a couple seconds of launch then you're in the wrong sport. (Bill wasn't too fuckin' stupid. He was just another victim of shit instruction and a total douchebag culture.)
And your alarm bells would be going off all the fuckin' time. And alarm bells that go off all the fuckin' time IMMEDIATELY cease being alarm bells and IMMEDIATELY start becoming background noise, annoyances, distractions.
Bill WAS in a new environment (and at this (his final) stage with only about a dozen mountain flight scattered over various sites)...
The accident pilot checked his harness points (parachute handle, leg straps, hook knife, etc.) assiduously. At least one witness stated that the accident pilot appeared a bit nervous both in this situation and before, while setting up his glider.
...and HAD alarm bells going off all over the place as he prepped for and executed launch. Problem was he didn't have the one that really mattered at the moment it really mattered - just like every other motherfucker involved in and watching that launch.
The alarm bell that we actually need and the one that actually works is the one that COMPETENT foot launch pilots have as they're about to commit. "Just how sure am I that I'm hooked in and have my leg loops? How flawlessly is my memory working right now?"
One way to manage this risk is to limit changes to equipment, flying sites, venue, and flying tasks to one element at a time. If you decide to fly a new site, for instance, avoid doing so with a brand-new harness or wing.
Boy, what a godsend it's been having you to explain all this shit to us. (Your mission, should you decide to accept, is to stuff a few magazine pages with a torrent of professional sounding useless crap to create the illusion that we're a legitimate, competent, responsible sport aviation organization.)
Go ahead, motherfucker... Cite some statistics to show us how and why all these changes - alterations in equipment, sites, venues, flying tasks - have any statistical bearing on unhooked launches whatsoever.
http://www.kitestrings.org/post12100.html#p12100
Mike Ivey - 2020/10/10
An argument could be made that a flyer dealing with loads of non routine shit would be MORE tuned in than he would doing the run-of-the-mill grind.
One important technique for managing risk at launch is to always make efficient use of any available ground crew.
- Yeah, you can never have too many cooks. The more the merrier.
- The Whitwell launch area was a sardine can as Bill prepped to launch. What's your point?
- Anybody beyond 2.3 level who needs crew to handle issues beyond helping to keep the glider under control on the ramp or cart shouldn't be rated beyond 2.3 level.
The pilot in command bears sole responsibility for the safe conduct of his or her flight.
- And the rating official who trained, qualified, certified him or her is totally off the hook.
- This was/is a Three rated site. Bill wouldn't have been cleared to fly if he weren't a known Three and/or his card hadn't been checked.
- Bill was functioning as a wind dummy.
A call for wind dummies was made, and the meet director was assessing conditions while awaiting volunteer non-competition pilots to arrive and perform the first launches.
(You made the mistake of putting that in print.)
- The Meet Head wouldn't have given that launch the green and Bill wouldn't have initiated it unless:
-- a fair smattering of regular comp gliders were ready to go
-- he had assessed the conditions as suitable
- If Bill had been approaching launch with a loose port tip batten he'd have been stopped and the issue would've been rectified.
Thus, performing a full and complete hang check just prior to flight is the sole responsibility of the pilot in command.
- Then how come none of the rating requirements that u$hPa's had on the books even mention a hang check - let alone define exactly what a full and complete hang check is and a time limit regarding "just prior to flight" to keep little shits like Ryan from claiming fifteen minutes is well within bounds?
And what's on the books is "just prior to LAUNCH" - not "just prior to FLIGHT". And the latter dilutes the impact of the intent.
- Duh. Bill could've legally and in accordance with everything on the books been up there launching totally solo. Hitchhike back up to launch to retrieve the vehicle. I did that on a few occasions at Woodstock. So what's your point?
-Got it, Joe. The primary purpose of filling up all this magazine acreage is to make sure nobody looks at or even thinks about this guy's shit noncompliant instruction and the total incompetence of the event organizers. And if you breathe a word about the "just prior to launch" issue the whole thing blows up in the faces of all the guilty parties.
- Bullshit. While there may not be a case for criminal negligence there's a real good case for civil liability. If this meet had gone off without a hitch and everybody had scored super flying experiences all week then everybody would've been congratulating Dean Funk and the relevant Tree Toppers on what great jobs they'd done. And you can't check the guy's card and conditions and move him up to the edge of the cliff unattached to his glider and then start playing the personal responsibility card. And if I'd been handling the suit for Bill's family it would've taken me about three milliseconds to demolish Steve for having violated the shit outta u$hPa's 1981/05 hook-in check mandate.
In discharging this responsibility, pilots should make maximum use of available ground crew to help ensure that whatever checks they routinely perform have been successfully completed prior to flight.
"I'm pretty sure I have my carabiner properly hooked into my hang strap - but I'm not entirely sure I got it well enough to keep me connected to my glider all the way down to the LZ. When you guys get through wiring that glider off would you mind coming back here and give things a thorough review? This sport runs on opinions and the more I get the more confident I am."
Nice job dialing this one down to the level of "all battens secured" and omitting the specification that this one needs to be effected IMMEDIATELY prior to launch because:
- there are legitimate reasons for:
-- arriving at launch unhooked
-- unhooking after moving the glider to or near to launch position
- an unsecured batten can be more obvious than an empty hang strap
Recommendation: Event organizers should encourage all pilots involved in an event to demonstrate that their aircraft is airworthy just prior to flight as a condition for launching during the event.
- Great idea. Designate a staging area about ten yards behind launch. Have the pilot hook in, main and backup, locked, proper clearance, helmet buckled... Next.
- Bill's aircraft was in great shape just prior to and during flight. Launched fine then - with no pilot input whatsoever - pulled up and landed pretty safely.
- Demonstrate to whom? And if whom misses something of significant importance what does he get in the way of consequences?
- Your PERSONAL recommendation? Who the fuck qualified you to go above and beyond the SOPs to tell us what we should be doing?
While the pilot in command bears sole responsibility for performing all required checks, accurately judging conditions, and conducting a safe flight...
How 'bout Bill? He was never connected to his glider on the last day of his life so it's a bit of a stretch to consider him any kind of pilot in command.
...it behooves everyone to do what they can to help fellow pilots achieve these goals.
They did. Lotsa participants asked him if he'd had a hang check, told him to make sure he got a hang check, verified that it looked like he was hooked in... What more do you want?
The wide range of operating conditions and flying equipment, the self-imposed lack of standardized operating practices...
The SELF-IMPOSED lack of standardized operating practices? Every time a legitimate SOP - like "just prior to launch", RLF, AT release capacity, minimum weak link rating, weak link configuration - has reared its ugly head the commercial interests have decided en masse to ignore and undermine it.
...and the understandable pre-occupation we all have ensuring the safe conduct of our own flight...
So how did that work out? Nobody ever once checked Bill out well enough to verify that he was connected to his glider, he was needlessly killed, emergency responders were called out, no other gliders flew that day, tons of people were horribly traumatized, a fair chunk of the participants bagged it and went home, next of kin filed a lawsuit against the club and national organization...
The collective competence of all those in Bill's vicinity and crewing at launch wasn't adequate to neutralize what everyone and his dog knew was the greatest threat to this flight. Why should we think people would do better with their own gear?
http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1153
Hooking In
Steve Kinsley - 2005/10/02 02:45:48 UTC
I already see where the anger and grief take us. We need to do hang checks, double hang checks. And who was on Bill's wire crew? How could they let that happen?
When Bob Gillisse got hurt I suggested that our local institution of the hang check is more the problem than the solution. I still believe that. It subverts the pilot's responsibility to perform a hook-in check. I often do not see pilots doing a hook in check. Why should they? They just did a hang check and they are surrounded by friends who will make sure this box is checked.
But what if there is no hang check and you are used to one?
DO A HOOK IN CHECK. You need a system that you do every time regardless of how many hang checks you have been subjected to that assures you are hooked in.
...makes this an extremely difficult task for the community.
- Not me. I'm quite capable of getting myself safely together and prepped. And when I'm not busy with my own setup I'm constantly looking around at other gliders. If I'd gotten my own shit together and moved up to observe that launch Bill wouldn't have gone off unhooked. And I'd have used the opportunity to explain to those dickheads what a hook-in check was and why it's in the SOPs everyone chooses to violate.
- Fuck the community. There is no community. Sport's controlled by commercial interests interested only in keeping their asses covered and you're working for them to curry favor.
Organized events, however, provide a more controlled and constrained environment, one where procedures could be implemented that would significantly enhance safety.
Yeah, take John Claytor at the 2014 Ridgely ECC for example. Right after he broke his neck coming off the cart on a makeshift runway in a severe left cross the Safety Committee shut things down for the day.
While several people reportedly challenged the pilot to confirm that he had performed a hang check, and had glanced at his equipment to see if everything looked OK, no one demanded to observe a full and complete hang check as a condition of helping him launch.
Yeah Joe. Keep emphasizing the full and complete hang check. You don't want people thinking that all it would've taken was one individual to go to the trouble of looking at or for his carabiner. It was all Bill's fault for not completing a full and complete hang check as a condition people helping him launch.
Had such a demand been made, and the accident pilot complied, this accident would never have occurred.
It would've occurred two weekends later - based upon our experience with Bill and Steve Wendt's training of him - in another mountain launch environment. And Steve Wendt didn't say anything about hang checks. The motherfucker never even had a public comment on this one. All we have is:
http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1166
Thoughts on responsibility...
Scott Wilkinson - 2005/10/05 14:10:56 UTC
For Steve, it all comes down to one thing: you've got to hook in. Period.
But I guess Bill never really understood the importance of doing that.
C.J. Sturtevant
A previous Master's Tips column by Rob Kells (page 56 in last month's issue) also addresses dealing with distractions during pre-flight, and offers suggestions on how to ensure that pilot and glider are firmly connected before committing aviation. It's worth rereading.
Why? I thought Joe covered every imaginable base at least three times over in this report. Or do you disagree?
From Impact plus Three:
http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1167
The way it outa be
Steve Kinsley - 2005/10/04 14:04:25 UTC
One last attempt.
We have now rounded up all the usual suspects and promised renewed vigilance, nine page checklists, hang checks every six feet, et cetera. Bob Gillisse redux.
A hang check is part of preflighting your equipment. You do it in the setup area - not on the launch or the ramp. When you get in line you are hooked in and ready to go. No going down for a hang check cum hook in check.
And Joe lives (lived?) 0.45 crow flight miles almost straight north of Steve in DC. And they did a lot of weekend flying trips together. And Steve was like an uncle/godfather to Joe and Janet's little adopted Eastern European kid. And that article is a total insult to what Rob, Steve, Doug Hildreth, the u$hPa SOPs, and (most articulately) Yours Truly have been saying. Anybody think it's a simple oversight that nowhere in that mountain of drivel does Joe even MENTION anything about any form of hook-in check?
Guess it took Tom Galvin the better part of another seven years to come up with the "false sense of security" angle.
Nice job, Joe. I have no doubt whatsoever that instructors will overhaul their programs appropriately, people will frequently cite passages from this article over the coming decades, the unhooked launch problem will rapidly fade into little more than a relic of the past.
