Been flying Crestline about a year now. I've seen more bent aluminum than twisted risers. Every time another hang pounds in, Steven, the resident PG master, just rolls his eyes and says something like, "And you guys think hang gliding is safer."
The USHPA Directors are well meaning volunteers, elected by popular vote of the members. They are generally among pilots that are highly respected like Dennis Pagen, Matt Taber, Paul Voight, etc. They are very much inclined to try to do a good job for the association. They can, they have, and they will likely make some mistakes as will most of us with our responsibilities. However, they are held accountable to the entire Board of Directors as well as the USHPA membership in it's entirety.
Actually, Deepfloat (Jim Rooney) said that during multiple lockout practices the weaklink broke before getting to the release. Too many to catalogue individually.
There is no evidence that the pilot made an attempt to release from tow prior to the weak link break, the gate was found closed on the Wallaby-style tow release.
Now I've heard the argument that "Weak links always break at the worst possible time, when the glider is climbing hard in a near stall situation," and that "More people have been injured because of a weak link than saved by one." Well, I for one have been saved by a weak link and would not even consider towing without one. I want to know without a doubt (1) when I am pushing too hard, and (2) what will break when I push too hard, and (3) that no other damage need result because I push too hard.
This ain't truck towing. There is no pressure limiting mechanism. Push out and you load the line. Push out hard and you'll break the weaklink... that's the whole idea.
The simple fact is this. The only reason anyone even gives Tad the time of day is that they want to believe him. Why? Because they don't like to be inconvenienced by a weaklink break. That's it.
Sure, everyone digs around for other reasons to believe, but at the heart of it, it's convenience.
No one is actually scared to fly with a standard weaklink. They may say they are, but deep down inside, they're not.
We have also found that certification criteria used in Flight Readiness Reviews often develop a gradually decreasing strictness. The argument that the same risk was flown before without failure is often accepted as an argument for the safety of accepting it again. Because of this, obvious weaknesses are accepted again and again, sometimes without a sufficiently serious attempt to remedy them, or to delay a flight because of their continued presence.
